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The business ecosystem concept was introduced in the early ‘90s. Since then the con-
cept has been used to describe cooperative value creation in various industries, but not
until the late ‘00s, the concept has been attracted a significantly wider interest among
scholars. However, while the business ecosystem concept is exploited a lot in the litera-
ture nowadays, smart grid applications such as demand response have drawn little en-
thusiasm for the concept. Yet demand response is considered, indeed, an important in-
gredient of the emerging smart grid paradigm as well as the business ecosystem concept
quite important to smart grid research. Hence, this thesis aims at affording some views
on the demand response ecosystems.
The research comprises a rigorous investigation into the nature of electricity markets in
the Nordic countries and conceptualization of business ecosystems. Thus, a narrative
review of the majority of relevant papers known to the author was conducted. The lit-
erature review is supplemented with additional empirical enquiry into the perceptions of
experts to deepen the understanding and knowledge of the issues on deregulated elec-
tricity markets. The focus is on the value creation procedure that changes with demand
response, rendering the roles of the actors and interlinks between them—i.e., rendering
the ecosystem structure. Quintessential is the maturation of the ecosystem; what kind of
ecosystem would be attractive to every actor.
The results indicate that the business ecosystem level approach opens new avenues to
understand and address the issues impeding demand response emergence on the deregu-
lated electricity markets. Essential is to identify the end customer of the value proposi-
tion in this particular ecosystem, not forgetting the intermediaries and complementors.
Regulatory restrictions should thoroughly be taken into account, too, when they govern
the market. The main findings implicate that the consumer cannot be considered as the
end customer of demand response services. Such services are probably more beneficial
to the suppliers or distribution system operators than to consumers. Additionally, com-
panies ought to delay launching their offers until regulation and regulators are account
for the role of demand response—e.g., whether it should be a part of regulated opera-
tions or deregulated. Consequently, the findings generally support the view that the
business ecosystem concept can shed light on the debate on demand response.
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Käsite liiketoimintaekosysteemi esiteltiin ensimmäisen kerran 1990-luvun alussa. Siitä
lähtien käsitettä on käytetty kuvaamaan yhteistoiminnallista arvonluontiprosessia useilla
eri toimialoilla. Käsite herätti suurempaa mielenkiintoa tutkijoiden keskuudessa kuiten-
kin vasta 2000-luvulla. Vaikka nykyään liiketoimintaekosysteemejä käsitellään kirjalli-
suudessa melko laajalti, sitä ei ole juuri sovellettu älykkäiden sähköverkkojen saralla tai
kysyntäjoustosta puhuttaessa. Tästä huolimatta kysyntäjousto on nähty eräänä tärkeim-
mistä sovellutuksista älykkäisiin sähköverkkoihin liittyen ja liiketoimintaekosysteemit
tärkeänä osana älysähköverkkotutkimusta. Näin ollen tämä diplomityö pyrkii tarjoa-
maan joitakin näkemyksiä kysyntäjoustoon liittyvistä ekosysteemeistä.
Tutkimus käsittää laaja-alaisen tarkastelun pohjoismaisiin sähkömarkkinoihin sekä lii-
ketoimintaekosysteemi käsitteeseen. Edellä mainittu tarkastelu pohjautuu kerronnalli-
seen kirjallisuuskatsaukseen. Ymmärrystä tarkasteltavaan aiheeseen on syvennetty em-
piirisellä tutkimuksella, joka sisältää usean alan ammattilaisen näkemyksiä niin markki-
noihin kuin kysyntäjoustoon liittyen. Tutkimus keskittyy arvonluontiprosessiin, joka
muuttuu liiketoimintaympäristön muuttuessa. Kysyntäjousto muuttaa liiketoimintaym-
päristöä ja näin ollen myös toimijoiden välisiä suhteita – toisin sanottuna kysyntäjousto
muokkaa sähkönmyynti- ja siirtoekosysteeemin rakennetta. Olennaista uudessa ekosys-
teemissä on, että se olisi kaikille osapuolille houkutteleva.
Tutkimustulokset osoittavat, että liiketoimintaekosysteemitason tarkastelu avaa uusia
näkemyksiä kysyntäjoustoon liittyvien ongelmien havaitsemisessa. Erityisesti kysyntä-
jouston kannalta on oleellista tunnistaa tarjooman loppuasiakas. Tämän lisäksi myös
lainsäädännölliset rajoitukset tulee huomioida sikäli kuin niillä on merkittävä vaikutus
markkinoiden toimintaan. Tulosten perusteella näyttää siltä, että sähkönkuluttaja ei ole
kysyntäjouston loppuasiakas, sillä esimerkiksi sähkönmyyjä tai siirtoyhtiö hyötyisi siitä
enemmän. Lisäksi havaittiin, että yritysten tulisi maltilla tuoda markkinoille kysyntä-
joustotuotteita nyt, kun lainsäännöllinen näkemys kysyntäjoustoon liittyen on vajavai-
nen. Yleisesti tulokset tukevat näkemystä, jonka mukaan ekosysteemitason tarkastelu
tällä liiketoiminta-alueella on tärkeää ja voi tuoda selvyyttä joihinkin ongelmiin.
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11 INTRODUCTION
One of the things to understand at the outset is simply, what does the val-
ue chain or ecosystem look like today? What are the different pieces?
How much money is there to be made in those different pieces? What
kinds of capabilities does your firm have or might it be able to acquire or
build upon to go into different parts of that value chain or ecosystem?
(Hopkins, 2011, p. 60)
1.1 Background
The National Academy of Engineering (2000) nominated electrification the greatest en-
gineering achievement of the twentieth century. In developed countries, under 0.05 per-
cent of the population lives without electricity (International Energy Agency, 2012)
leading to the consideration that electrification and energy are commonly taken for
granted. In the same breath, the number of people without electricity access in the whole
world will lower from nineteen percent in 2010 to twelve percent in 2030 (International
Energy Agency, 2012). However, the existing electric power infrastructure was not de-
signed to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century (Depuru, Wang, &
Devabhaktuni, 2011; Gellings, 2011; Hammons, 2008; International Energy Agency,
2011; SGMM, 2010; Wang & Lu, 2013). Smart grids and smart grid applications such
as demand response (DR) could become, if not the greatest, at least a remarkable engi-
neering achievement of the present century.
The promising potential notwithstanding, there are many issues yet to be resolved for
smart grid initiatives to take off. Changing tack is imperative since “current trends in
energy supply and use are patently unsustainable—economically, environmentally, and
socially” (Tanaka, 2011, p. 1). Thus, sustainability is a significant driver toward smarter
electricity grids and solutions. To address the sustainability challenges, the European
Union (EU), for example, has set the energy and emission targets for 2020. In the EU’s
climate and energy policy, so-called “20-20-20” targets aim for a reduction in green-
house gas emissions, increase in the use of renewable energy sources, and improvement
in energy efficiency (European Union, 2007). In the smart grid environment, demand-
side management (DSM), including DR and energy efficiency, has clearly been shown
to be a potential approach to address the challenges concerning the electricity supply
and consumption (Malik & Bouzguenda, 2011; Strbac, 2008; U.S. Department of
Energy, 2006). However, even if more sustainable energy environment could be techni-
cally achieved by utilizing DSM, still a full utilization of smart grid with its applications
seems distant.
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The full utilization of the smart grid concept will probably presume a very different ap-
proach to managing the relationship between electricity consumers, utilities, and other
participants compared to the status quo. In addition, in a global context, the benefits of
DR in particular are quite different in regions with deregulated, organized energy mar-
kets (e.g., the Nordic countries) than in regions with vertically integrated utilities (e.g.,
the United States of America) providing monopoly electricity services to end-users
(Heffner, 2009). In short, DR refers to a load shifting or shedding from critical times to
the moments of lower consumption. The importance of DR increases as more renewable
energy sources (RES) are integrated into the grid causing more fluctuation of supply.
Furthermore, energy efficiency can be generally improved in many ways without the
consumers’ active participation (Environmental Protection Agency, 2012), but DR typi-
cally requires customer behavioral changes as its benefits are achieved by stimuli at the
consumption end (U.S. Department of Energy, 2006). One can assume that interest in
DR keeps growing as electricity consumption grows and renewable energy sources are
increasingly exploited.
This thesis examines the relationships between various participants (later referred also
as  actors,  elements,  or  players)  in  the  emerging  smart  grid  environment.  Borrowing
from a business ecosystem concept (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a; J. F. Moore, 1993, 1996;
Teece, 2007), it deals with DR in the organized energy markets focusing on the eco-
nomic constraints on the development of viable business opportunities in this field.
Firstly,  the thesis aims to afford a visualized ecosystem depiction to identify the prob-
lematic nodes impeding the implementation of DR applications. Due to the structure of
the deregulated energy markets and need for the consumers actively to participate, the
business models are considered to appear differently in comparison to the situation as it
stands. Secondly, the thesis endeavors to provide alternatives how to overcome possible
obstacles in order to develop a functioning demand response ecosystem in the deregu-
lated energy markets. Theoretical approaches are complemented with experts’ percep-
tions and the results of workshops organized in the SGEM program.
1.2 Research context
Ginsberg et al. argue “at least for smart grids, employing an innovation [or business]
ecosystem strategy appears quite important” (2010, p. 2792). Additionally, Cowan notes
one element of smart grid being an “identification and lowering of unreasonable or un-
necessary barriers to adoption of smart grid technologies, practices, and services” (2013,
p. 68). The business ecosystem mindset is actually a useful tool to analyze unreasonable
and unnecessary barriers concerning the smart grid implementation, and also whether
the issues lie in the cooperation of firms. The cooperation of firms is a vital asset in the
pursuit of a flourishing business ecosystem, thus exploiting the ecosystem framework
seems equally important in DR study, as well. Further, the utilization of DR requires a
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new approach to how various elements converge in order to achieve viable DR busi-
nesses.
The new approach utilized in this study stems from Adner’s perception: “what matters
here [in ecosystem] are the elements, not their ownership” (2012, p. 87). In this study,
the elements and their relationships are examined to provide new insights into the future
of electricity markets and DR ecosystems. The motivation stems from a global need for
more modern solutions concerning the whole energy environment than we have utilized
so far. This thesis is carried out as part of Smart Grids and Energy Markets (SGEM) re-
search program which aims at developing international smart grid solution to be demon-
strated in a real environment utilizing Finnish R&D (research and development) infra-
structure.
1.3 Aim and objectives
The purpose of this study is to propose a viable value blueprint for a business taking ad-
vantage of DR via employing the business ecosystem framework, which focuses on the
interaction between firms, regulatory authorities, and customers. The purpose of the
study wells from a research question, thus making the question an important part of the
research study. The research question should have both substance and form (Yin, 2009,
p. 10). The substance tells the reader what the study is about, and the form qualifies the
approach: “who”, “why”, “how”, etc. Now, in the smart grid environment, exploitation
of demand response will most likely require an entirely novel approach to managing the
relationships between the various actors in the ecosystem. In light of this, this thesis fo-
cuses on the question:
What kind of demand response ecosystems can be identified concerning the
emerging smart grid paradigm, and what roles and restrictions can be identified?
Accordingly, the research question is somewhat twofold by nature. Firstly, it endeavors
to determine what kinds of ecosystem structures can be identified so that every actor
could win and ecosystem benefit as a whole. Secondly, the question addresses the ele-
ments in the ecosystem that are most likely to change as the ecosystem matures along
with DR. The literature on business ecosystems provides means of recognizing substan-
tial participants and risks of an ecosystem. However, the literature clearly studies the
past and illustrates cases with hindsight. Furthermore, the concept of the business eco-
system has been little, if at all, applied to DR studies as yet. This thesis strives for ad-
dressing the problems and outlining visual ecosystem blueprints in an unprecedented
manner: in advance.
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Three research objectives have been formulated to fulfill the purpose of this study and
to be able respond to the challenges posed by the research question. The main ambition
of this thesis is:
I To recognize the fundamental actors in the demand response ecosystem. This
objective includes a review of the literature on business ecosystems and, addi-
tionally, looks over the steps to construct a value blueprint.
II To distinguish the problematic nodes hindering the adoption of DR technolo-
gies, practices, and services. This objective involves the recognition of charac-
teristic features of the electricity markets and business models in the corre-
sponding field.
III To provide alternative ways to overcome possible obstacles in order to develop
a functioning business ecosystem. This objective analyzes the divergent ap-
proach to the ecosystem and especially to the end customer of DR business.
The objective I establishes the backbone of the study to address the objectives II and III.
The objective II pursues the rationale behind the introductory clause of the research
question that entails the need for novel insight into the field at issue. Hence, the objec-
tive III will be achieved by answering the actual research question. In order to achieve
these objectives, the next section introduces the approach and method exploited in this
study.
1.4 Approach and method
The novelty of the ecosystem approach to DR predicts challenges to categorize an un-
ambiguous and suitable research approach. Given the fact that the ecosystem framework
has mostly utilized to explain cases with hindsight, this thesis requires conceptual think-
ing  at  an  abstract  level  since  it  looks  forward.  Moreover,  a  comprehensive  review  of
ecosystem literature is fundamental to build an understanding of what is tried to depict
and how. In addition, to be able to grasp the big picture one also has to establish a suffi-
cient knowledge of electricity markets, including the concept of smart grid and DR.
Hence, the discussion on electricity markets and ecosystem literature form the back-
ground to the study.
The mentioned purpose of the study, as well as the novelty of the approach to DR, indi-
cates a pragmatic research philosophy, thus building on the research question. The term
‘research philosophy’ relates to the development of knowledge and its nature and,
moreover, pragmatism argues that the research question indeed is the most important
driver when assessing the knowledge and its nature (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill,
2009, pp. 107–109). Furthermore, this study employs only qualitative data.
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According to Yin (1989), two different ways can be exploited to approach qualitative
data: deductive and inductive. Saunders et al. argue that some of the significant differ-
ences between deduction and induction are as follows: deduction emphasizes generally
an insight of “moving from theory to data” and “the necessity to select samples of suffi-
cient size in order to generalise conclusion” whereas induction expect “a close under-
standing of the research context” and is “less concerned with the need to generalise”
(2009, p. 127). This study lies in between deduction and induction since it has charac-
teristics of both approaches. The ecosystem framework stems from the literature. Fur-
ther, the existing literature is employed to formulate a research question and objectives.
On the other hand, this study presumes a close understanding of the research context,
which, in turn, seems to have few, or lack, proper real-life cases (i.e., operating busi-
nesses) from which to gather the empirical data.
Taking the preceding discussion together, this study combines deduction and induction
into a multiple method study. The study aims to deepen the insight of future DR busi-
ness and its issues with a ‘wide lens’ (Adner, 2012). Consequently, the thesis strives for
clarifying the issues that arise when experts with different instincts try to debate the
right course of action. Moreover, it endeavors to provide another, objective point of
view instead of testing the theory into practice or constructing a new one.
1.5 Limitations
To begin with, this thesis focuses mostly on the economic aspect, thus scoping out the
discussion on possible technical constraints impeding the emergence of smart grid and
DR. As presented hereinafter, the costs vis-à-vis the benefits of large scale DR imple-
mentation is well studied and published (e.g., Faruqui, Hledik, et al., 2009). For this
reason, this study does not assess economic, social, or environmental benefits of DR but
rather assumes these benefits exist. However, the benefits are considered to such extent
as it is necessary to formulate the value propositions that, in turn, are essentials in re-
gard to the validity of the results.
Despite the fact that various programs and ways of deploying DR exist, all of them are
not discussed in a great detail since little differences can be distinguished between some
particular programs. The aforementioned will become apparent when the backgrounds
of the study are discussed in depth. Therefore, some programs are unified, yet maintain-
ing the validity of the study. Consequently, different DR programs are exploited to the
extent to which they have a significant impact on the value blueprint formation.
This thesis concentrates on the Nordic, liberalized electricity markets, thus ignoring
markets where vertically integrated utility and electricity supplier exist (e.g., the most
part of the U.S.). Moreover, ancillary or system services, other than balancing services,
have not been discussed in a great extent, albeit DR has a high potential to address a
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number of other issues as well (e.g., Ma et al., 2013). Because of the inadequacy of re-
sources and time, the majority of ancillary services are not discussed. Additionally, the
study focuses on consumers who purchase their electricity from a supplier (i.e., residen-
tial consumers as well as small and medium enterprises). This is because the large share
of available demand response capacity of large-scale industry is already exploited in the
electricity market by the balancing market (Aalto, Segerstam, Pietilä, & Gröhn, 2013).
1.6 Thesis structure
The thesis begins with an introductory chapter introducing the research topic and outlin-
ing the background on the subject. Further, the introduction comprises a short descrip-
tion of the research context, aim and objectives of the study, research approach and
method, and limitations. The introduction is followed by deeper study on the back-
ground and relevant literature, from which the synthesis is drawn as well as the conclu-
sions (see Figure 1-1).
The second chapter covers the major background to electricity markets and DR. It con-
cerns the specific Nordic electricity market characteristics laying the foundation for
what follows. Given the limitations, the Nordic electricity markets are not examined in-
clusively, but to build a working knowledge of it for further discussion. Chapter 2 de-
scribes the smart grid concept, too, and the major practices concerning DR. Finally, the
chapter concludes with a value assessment of DR.
Next, Chapter 3 covers the major theoretical approach to the thesis. The chapter ad-
dresses the ecosystem perspective in order to conceptualize the vantage point of this
study. Moreover, the chapter covers a wide range of literature on business ecosystems
and introduces the main framework that is applied to several cases. The main frame-
work, the value blueprint, is a novel approach to DR, however.
The fourth chapter describes the research method and material. Since this is a research
study, the chapter presents the methodology and approach according to which the thesis
is conducted. The chapter expounds the analysis of the research material, too. In other
words, it discusses the origin of the material and its nature, justifying the reliability and
validity of the thesis.
Now, taking the preceding discussion together, Chapter 5 provides an insight of the
business ecosystems applied to DR business opportunities and issues. The insight is
formed by the approach and method discussed in Chapter 4, literature review, and em-
pirically obtained experts’ perceptions. The chapter is segregated in subsections, each of
which has their own focus. The subsections lay the foundation for DR ecosystems and
outline the forthcoming in a general manner. Moreover, they cover a new view on eco-
system, the swimlane blueprint, as well as both AMR and HEMS cases to deploy DR.
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The HEMS ecosystems include a forward-looking way to approach the DR businesses,
integrating also other functionalities to the technology and applications.
Ultimately, the last chapter draws the conclusions. The conclusions recapitulate the
whole study, endeavoring to present a concise round-up of the study’s end results. Addi-
tionally, it entails both the theoretical contribution and managerial implications of the
findings of the thesis as well as assesses the reliability and validity of the study. Moreo-
ver, the last chapter provides some suggestions for further research concerning demand
response and its business outlook.
Figure 1-1: Structure of the thesis, outlining the general path along which the thesis is
conducted.
82 ELECTRICITY MARKET AND DEMAND RE-
SPONSE
2.1 Current electricity system
2.1.1 Technical subsystem
This chapter begins step-by-step digging deeper into the electricity system and the mar-
ket laying the foundation for discussion of smart grid and subsequently smart grid eco-
systems. The term ‘electricity system’ is used to describe the physical electricity infra-
structure that transmits electricity and also provides related services. The electricity sys-
tem includes both the technical subsystem discussed in this section and the economic
subsystem discussed in the following chapter. (De Vries, 2004.) The physical electricity
infrastructure—i.e., the technical subsystem indicating electricity flows—comprises
conceptually power generation, grid, and load (Ten Donkelaar & Scheepers, 2004).
Grid consists of a nationwide transmission grid, regional networks, and distribution
networks. The transmission and distribution networks are required to interconnect the
electric energy generation with the load as they often occur at great distance from each
other (Karady, 2012). The reason of centralized production is, for example, environ-
mental issues with large power plants and safety concerns. Substations and transformers
are required between generation and grid, transmission grid and distribution network,
and distribution and load along the way. This is for economic and safety reasons as en-
ergy losses are the lower, the higher the voltage of electricity. (Elovaara & Laiho,
2007.)
Electric energy is transmitted from producers to consumers (also referred to as final cus-
tomers) that cause the load, through a complex grid network operated by TSO (trans-
mission  system  operator)  and  DSOs  (distribution  system  operators).  Note  that,  in  the
figures, different actors of the same type are, for simplicity, aggregated into one pre-
sented actor (e.g., different DSOs are all presented as one actor DSO). To clarify,
transmission grid, operated by TSO, is an extra high voltage or high voltage1 network
connected to regional and distribution networks through step-down transformers that
lower the voltage of electricity. The voltage of the transmission grid is not functional for
electric devices but too high; thus, the voltage has to be lowered before delivering to the
1 Extra high-voltage is defined as a voltage level equal to or larger than 220 kV. High voltage is defined
as a voltage level smaller than 220 kV but bigger than or equal to 35 kV.
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distribution network (Lakervi & Holmes, 1995, p. 9). For instance, in Finland, house-
holds are typically equipped with low voltage networks delivering 230 V phase-to-
ground whereas the transmission grid delivers 110–400 kV and distribution network 6–
20 kV (Elovaara & Laiho, 2007).
Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and the Council concerning common
rules for the internal market in electricity, 2009 OJ L 211, 13 July 2009 (hereinafter Di-
rective 2009/72/EC), defines the transmission as “the transport of electricity…with a
view to its delivery to final customers or to distributors” excluding the sale or resale of
electricity to customers (p.62).  Distribution is defined the same way with a distinction
of electricity delivery to wholesale or final customer on high voltage, medium voltage,
or low voltage grid operated by DSOs. Furthermore, the delineation between the TSO
and DSOs is somewhat arbitrary (De Vries, 2004) as seen in Table 2-1 where the defini-
tions of a few relevant parties are given.
‘Square one’ in the physical electricity subsystem is the power producer generating
Table 2-1: Definitions of several relevant parties in electricity market. Adapted from
EU’s Directive (European Parliament and Council, 2009, pp. 62–64).
Party Definition
Producer A natural or legal person generating electricity.
TSO Transmission system operator is responsible for operating, ensuring the maintenance
of and, if necessary, developing the transmission system in a given area and, where
applicable, its interconnections with other systems, and for ensuring the long-term
ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the transmission of electricity.
TSO is also responsible for the security of supply and an area to be electrically sta-
ble. The transmission of electricity is a natural monopoly.
DSO Distribution system operator is responsible for operating, ensuring the maintenance
of and, if necessary, developing the distribution system in a given area and, where
applicable, its interconnections with other systems and for ensuring the long-term
ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the distribution of electricity.
Electric power quality and power reaching final customer lie with DSO. The distri-
bution of electricity is a natural monopoly.
Ancillary service A service necessary for the operation of a transmission or distribution system. Ancil-
lary services are needed to keep a balance between supply and demand, stabilizing
the transmission system and maintaining the power quality.
Supplier The sale, including resale, of electricity to customers is managed by the supplier.
Suplier is also referred to as retailer.
Final customer An electricity consumer who purchases electricity for her/his/its own use from the
supplier of her/his/its choice.
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electricity. After generation, voltage (i.e., electrical potential difference) is raised via the
step-up transformers and fed into the transmission grid (Van Werven & Scheepers,
2005). Typically, TSO transmits electricity to the distribution grid from which it is de-
livered to the consumers by DSOs (Van Werven & Scheepers, 2005). Alternatively,
large, much electricity consuming industrial consumers that demand high voltage elec-
tric power can be attached to the grid straight from the transmission grid. More interest-
ing than the physical route of electricity, however, are the economic transactions be-
tween the actors. As value delivery in the demand response ecosystem is concern of this
thesis, the next section discusses about the economic subsystem of electricity supply.
2.1.2 Economic subsystem
As the technical subsystem is about the electricity flows, the economic subsystem is
about the monetary value of the business. In the Nordic countries, liberalization of the
electricity market led to distinguish between the technical and economic subsystems,
and due to liberalization, TSO and DSOs are not eligible to participate in the electricity
market but operate under regulation as natural monopolies. Figure 2-1 illustrates the
physical path of electricity (the black line) and the financial transactions carried out be-
tween different actors to exchange electricity (the yellow line). The economic subsys-
tem, or commodity subsystem, comprises actors that are involved in the production,
trade,  or  consumption  of  electricity  and  their  supporting  activities  as  well  (De  Vries,
2004).
In the financial sense, the producers sell generated electricity in the electricity market. A
producer can sell power straight to an energy retailer as well, who otherwise would pur-
chase electricity from the electricity market. Large electricity consumers can buy elec-
tricity directly from the wholesale market (see Figure 2-1). Furthermore, retailer can
have own production, too, and serve both as producer and retailer. The consumers final-
ly purchase their electricity from the retailer (also supplier). In practice, the economic
subsystem is not that simple as described, but more exact definition is not needed in
here.
In his dissertation concerning the liberalization of electricity markets, Laurens de Vries
(2004) argues that the technical subsystem is under control of the economic subsystem
which, in turn, is constrained by the technical subsystem. Moreover, competition law
and the EU directives regulate the economic subsystem and, for instance, operating li-
censes and emissions permits constrain the technical subsystem. The aim of the liberali-
zation of the electricity market has been to assure the transparency of pricing to the con-
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sumers. For example, vertical integration2 of the TSO and DSO is prohibited by law in
Finland. However, the liberalization has led the parties in a situation where conflict of
interests arises as regulated and deregulated players target quite different goals. That is,
the suppliers’ benefit would not necessarily be the DSOs benefit, too (the conflict of
interest are discussed in depth later). All the market players who can entry to and exit
from the market without any regulatory issues are referred to as deregulated players.
2.2 Electricity market structure
2.2.1 The Nordic electricity market
The Nordic countries (i.e., Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) have adopted free,
shared electricity market with one common energy exchange and nationally independent
TSOs. In addition, all the Nordic countries have liberalized their electricity markets,
opening both electricity trading and production to competition; that is, parties which
fulfill the certain criteria can enter the market (NordREG, 2009). According to Directive
2009/72/EC, for the consumers and suppliers the liberalization means that all consumers
are able to choose freely their suppliers, and all suppliers can freely choose whether to
deliver to their customers. Figure 2-2 presents a depiction of actors involved in the elec-
tricity market in Finland. The structure, with the exception of authorities, is somewhat
the same in all Nordic countries.
2 The degree to which a firm owns its upstream suppliers and its downstream buyers is referred to as ver-
tical integration. Vertical integration means matching on upstream and downstream components of the
value chain in order to provide an internal hedge.
Figure 2-1: Overview of the electricity system showing both technical and economic
subsystems; the black line indicates the route of physical electricity; the yellow line
shows the money flow (excluding network tariffs).
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In the Nordic electricity market, the liberalization is a fundamental factor to take into
account since it has an inevitable influence on companies’ business models (European
Commission, 2006). As stated earlier, neither the TSOs nor DSOs are eligible to be in-
volved in the electricity market in a traditional sense. For example, in Finland, chapter
12 of the Electricity Market Act 588/2013 (later the Act) stipulates the unbundling of
operations.  Section  77  of  the  Act  prohibits  a  TSO or  DSO operating  in  the  electricity
market from bundling any electricity system operations with other electricity trade op-
erations (e.g., the electricity supply). The Act prohibits, too, the system operator from
bundling grid operations and distribution system operations—in other words, the inte-
gration of a DSO and the TSO is outlawed. Moreover, due to liberalization the respon-
sibility for the secure transmission and distribution operation has separated from the
electricity generation business (European Commission, 2006).
As mentioned, system operations shall be unbundled with other electricity trade opera-
tions, meaning that all electricity consumers have to conclude two separate contracts.
Pursuant to section 84 of the Act, the electricity system contract means a contract con-
cluded between a DSO and consumer concerning electricity distribution through the
grid; an electricity sale contract means a contract between a supplier and consumer con-
cerning the electricity supply, as depicted in Figure 2-2. The DSOs are responsible for
electricity consumption metering in many countries (Belhomme et al., 2009), and they
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Figure 2-2: The main actors in the Nordic electricity market. Adapted and modified
from Sæle, Rosenberg, and Feilberg (2010, p. 53).
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provide the metering data to the electricity suppliers (Van Werven & Scheepers, 2005).
In the Nordic countries, all the suppliers operate on the common power exchange, Nord
Pool Spot AS (later Nord Pool Spot), which runs the leading electricity market in Eu-
rope (Nord Pool Spot, 2013). The suppliers trade in both day-ahead and intra-day ener-
gy markets with Nord Pool Spot (Nord Pool Spot, 2013); the monopoly position not-
withstanding, the balancing market (BM) is organized by the TSO (NordREG, 2009).
Moreover, the TSO overlaps the roles of being a monopoly actor and market participant,
as shown in Figure 2-2.
Nord Pool Spot operates under Norwegian laws and authorities as it is a Norwegian reg-
istered company (Nord Pool Spot, 2013). Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Di-
rectorate (NVE) operates as a regulatory authority,  and the Ministry of Petroleum and
Energy (OED) controls the physical power exchange with neighboring countries
(Ministry  of  Petroleum  and  Energy,  2013).  In  the  Nordic  countries,  others  than  Nord
Pool Spot operate under the country specific regulations and legislation (Ministry of
Petroleum and Energy, 2013) such as competition laws (Sæle & Grande, 2011); for in-
stance, the Competition Act (948/2011) in Finland. Unlike the energy suppliers, neither
the TSOs nor DSOs can operate under the competition laws due to their monopoly posi-
tions—not even the TSOs their overlapping roles regardless. For instance, in Finland,
the DSOs earning are regulated, and their reasonableness is supervised by the Energy
Market Authority (EMV) (Energy Market Authority, 2011a). The EMV also supervises
the Finnish TSO’s (Fingrid Oyj), earnings that are established under a reasonable return
concept (Energy Market Authority, 2011b). As the TSO is responsible for the construc-
tion of cross-border power lines and the import and export of electricity, it is also under
the supervision of the Ministry of Trade and Industry for the foregoing operations
(NordREG, 2009).
2.2.2 Day-ahead energy market
The day-ahead energy market, also referred to as Elspot market, is a day-ahead auction
to  exchange  electricity  in  the  Nordic  region  (Nord  Pool  Spot,  2013).  Elspot  market  is
one of the physical electricity markets among Elbas and the regulating power markets in
the Nord Pool Spot (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2013). The Nord Pool Spot in-
cludes a financial  market as well,  which is,  however,  excluded from this study. At El-
spot, the electricity producers (supply bids), suppliers (demand bids), and other actors
wishing to exchange electricity over the Nord Pool Spot market area send their bids for
the following day (Alagna et al., 2011). Elspot includes three different types of bids:
single hourly bids, block bids, and flexible hourly bids; however, the main idea of each
method is giving price and volume bids separately for each hour (Nord Pool Spot,
2013).
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Elspot, to which bids are submitted electronically, is open 365 days a year, and the auc-
tion is closed every day at 12:00 CET3 (Nord Pool Spot, 2013). As Figure 2-3 depicts,
the supply bids from several producers and the demand bids from a number of suppliers
are aggregated into a supply curve and demand curve, respectively. Further, the inter-
section of the aggregate supply and demand curves forms a theoretical common price
(i.e., system price) in the exchange area (Nord Pool Spot, 2013; Stavseth, 2013). The
Elspot system price is then used as a reference price for settling financial  power con-
tracts (Flatabø, Doorman, Grande, Randen, & Wangensteen, 2003). Moreover, the sys-
tem price is calculated for infinite transmission capacity in the grid resulting in the area
prices which occur in a case bottlenecks, or capacity limitations, in the main grid
(Stavseth, 2013). In general, the area price is determined by the same way as the system
price, but with a higher price in the deficit area and lower price in the surplus area (Nord
Pool Spot, 2013). The area price might also be equal to the system price. In that event,
the transmission capacity between Elspot areas is not exceeded, ending in a single spot
price throughout the market (Flatabø et al., 2003).
As stated earlier, the bids are made for each hour separately. That is, the price formation
graph can be drawn for every hour a day, and every hour receives its own price and vol-
3 The Central European Time (CET) is a standard time which is one hour ahead of Coordinated Universal
Time (UTC), or Greenwich Mean Time—i.e., CET is UTC+01:00. CET is used to a great extent in Eu-
rope, e.g., in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.
Figure 2-3: The price formation in the day-ahead market. The system price (euros per
megawatt hour) and turnover (megawatt hours) are given by the intersection of the sup-
ply and demand curves.
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ume turnover, see Figure 2-3. As seen in the figure, the greater the price, the more the
producers are willing to produce; however, the production capacity is limited, resulting
in exponentially higher prices as demand increases. Reciprocally, the lower the price,
the more the consumers are willing to buy. Moreover, one of the main theories of eco-
nomics, the law of supply and demand, applies suggesting that consumers respond to
the increasing prices by lowering consumption. In Chapter 2.3.4, Figure 2-6 illustrates
the demand-price curve as well as the hourly spot prices that have been determined in
the market by the aforementioned manner.
2.2.3 Intra-day energy market
Elbas is the intra-day energy market which supplements Elspot market and its main
function are to secure the necessary balance between supply and demand (Nord Pool
Spot, 2013). At Elbas, trading is continuously possible up to one hour before delivery,
and it gives the participants a chance to adjust their supply or demand bids between the
day-ahead market and the balancing market (Alagna et al., 2011). Although the majority
of the energy is traded at Elspot, unforeseeable consequences may occur due to, for ex-
ample, sudden changes in weather conditions or failure in a large nuclear power plant.
This is where Elbas plays a crucial role in the markets by enabling trading close to time
of delivery, thus maintaining the market balance (Nord Pool Spot, 2013).
The EU targets aim to increase the usage of renewable energy sources, meaning that
more wind and solar power will enter the grid in the near future than it has so far. Un-
predictability of the supply of the weather dependent energy sources results in severe
need for the intra-day market since imbalances need to be offset between Elspot auc-
tions and production volume (Nord Pool Spot, 2013). At Elbas, participants are able to
conduct final adjustments to achieve a balance between supply and demand prior to de-
livery. Otherwise, the imbalance will occur if the consumption and generation are not at
the same level at the time of delivery. Hence, Elbas offers an alternative to the balanc-
ing market for the imbalances a supplier may have after the day-ahead market (Nord
Pool Spot, 2013). The balancing market, however, is required, and the national TSOs
are responsible for the after delivery regulating market that automatically takes place
when necessary (NordREG, 2009).
2.2.4 Balancing market
The balancing market or the regulating market is a TSO managed market place to main-
tain balance between the total generation and consumption of electric power in real time
(Meeus, Purchala, & Belmans, 2005). In the Nordic countries, the national balancing
power markets are part of the larger Nordic balancing power market (Fingrid, 2013).
The bids at Elspot and Elbas are always predictions as they are made before the actual
consumption. Moreover, the predictions inevitably go wrong at some point, and the
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TSO has either up-regulate or down-regulate the power meaning the demand is too high
compared to supply or there is more production than consumption in the grid, respec-
tively (International Energy Agency, 2003). Fingrid (2013)—the Finnish TSO—defines
the balancing power market as “a ‘tool’ required by the maintenance of the Nordic pow-
er balance.”
The TSO maintains the balance between supply and demand by the utilization of auto-
matic frequency control and by acquiring balance power from the balancing market
(NordREG, 2006). According to Fingrid (2013), players that own capacity which can be
regulated “can submit bids of their available regulating capacity to this market.” Fur-
thermore, the TSO purchases the required balancing power from the balancing market.
The TSO sells balance power to the balancing responsible party (BRP) which energy
consumption overshoots the production (Alagna et al., 2011). Moreover, the BRP is an
entity responsible for “having equivalent injection and subtraction of electricity from
the grid” (Belhomme et al., 2009, p. 125). The balance between the demand and supply
can also be settled via utilization of demand response (NordREG, 2006), which, with
the smart grids in general, is clearly one of the main themes of this thesis.
2.3 Smart grid and demand response
2.3.1 What is a smart grid?
Today’s traditional power grid was previously described as the one-way system in
which electricity flows from the central power stations to the consumers via transmis-
sion and distribution networks. Consumer participation after signing an electricity
agreement is somewhat nonexistent, they consume but do not produce energy and the
load is not controllable. Since the uncontrollability, the electricity suppliers, DSOs, and
TSOs suffer financial losses that can be lowered significantly through smart grid utiliza-
tion  (Easton,  House,  &  Byars,  2012;  Giordano,  Gangale,  Fulli,  &  Sánchez  Jiménez,
2011; Valtonen, Honkapuro, & Partanen, 2011) although conflict of interests, for in-
stance, is hindering the change (Belonogova, Kaipia, Lassila, & Partanen, 2011). In ad-
dition to the economic drivers, there are environmental and social drivers, too, to pursue
a smarter grid. Table 2-2 presents some of the major differences between the traditional
electricity network and the smart grid.
The foregoing differences are quite general. Additionally,  Mason Willrich has noted
that the smart grid is “variously defined” (2009, p. 35). In general, the grid itself is the
same, but new applications around the grid are able to improve the efficiency and sus-
tainability of the physical system and also provide new potential business cases for the
players in the long term. The European Technology Platform (ETP) SmartGrids (2006)
has outlined the smart grid as “an electricity network that can intelligently integrate the
actions of all users connected to it—generators, consumers, and those that do both—in
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order to efficiently deliver sustainable, economic, and secure electricity supplies.”
Moreover, Erich Gunther describes the concept of the smart grid in an even more gen-
eral manner:
A. [smart grid is] an enhanced electric transmission or distribution network that
extensively utilizes internet-like communications network technology, distribut-
ed computing and associated sensors and software (including equipment in-
stalled on the premises of an electric customer) to provide
i. smart metering;
ii. demand response;
iii. distributed generation management;
iv. electrical storage management;
v. thermal storage management;
vi. transmission management;
vii. power outage and restoration detection;
viii. power quality management;
ix. preventive maintenance improves the reliability, security and ef-
ficiency of the distribution grid;
x. distribution automation; or
B. other facilities,  equipment,  or systems that operate in conjunction with such
communications network, or that directly interface with the electric utility
transmission or distribution network, to provide the capabilities described in
clauses (i) through (x) in paragraph (A). (2007, pp. 3–4)
Table 2-2: Differences between the traditional grid and smart grid (European
Commission, 2006, pp. 15–17).
Traditional grid Smart grid
Large generating stations Distributed generation and renewable energy
sources
Centralized control Flexible operation and maintenance
Old, one-way technology Demand-side management through two-way
communication
Optimized for regional power adequacy Distributed generation connected close to consum-
ers
Conflicting regulatory and commercial frame-
works
Consistent legal frameworks enabling cross-border
trading of power and grid services
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A generalized visual depiction of smart grid infrastructure is shown in Figure 2-4. When
applying the former definition of Gunther (2007), the figure illustrates that the smart
grid could be improved. For example, DR could be utilized via smart metering in offic-
es, houses, and industrial plants whereas wind turbines, fuels cells, micro-turbines,
CHP, and photovoltaic (PV) represent distributed generation (DG). Electric power stor-
ages can be executed in a couple of ways as part of virtual power plant (i.e., aggregator)
or an independent storage facility. Transmission and power quality in an interconnected
grid are managed by TSO and DSOs respectively.
The smart grid is a variously defined concept; many more variations of the definition
can be found in the literature. Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of the thesis to clarify
the smart grid definitional complications. The purpose of the definitional explanation is
to point out that it is quite difficult to address the issues if the concept is not clear. This
thesis  focuses  on  demand  response  (DR)  through  smart  metering  and  utilization  of
AMR (automatic meter reading) and HEMS (home energy management system).
Generation Transmission Distribution Consumption
Figure 2-4: Schematic illustrations of the traditional grid (top) and smart grid (bot-
tom). The blue line shows the path of physical electricity; the yellow line indicates in-
formation exchange.
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2.3.2 Automatic meter reading
Compared to the conventional energy meters, the smart meters are referred to as ad-
vanced energy meters that collect the data about energy consumption and provide addi-
tional information on electricity quality to the DSOs (Depuru et al., 2011). Smart meters
facilitate retrieving the data about consumers’ electricity consumption and power quali-
ty easily, remotely, more often, and more cost efficiently than conventional energy me-
ters (Valtonen et al., 2011). With an advanced smart meter, it is possible to read real-
time energy consumption information and securely communicate that data onward
(Depuru et al., 2011), for example, to the utility company (i.e., DSO) (see Figure 2-5).
Smart meters can also execute control commands remotely and limit the electricity con-
sumption according to the utilities requests (Vojdani, 2008). Some AMR-based meters,
however, do not offer the functionality to limit the consumption remotely but more fre-
quent consumption reading (e.g., hourly) and to switch the meter on or off remotely.
Remotely readable meters based on AMR technology allow, nonetheless, a number of
benefits  compared  to  conventional  meters  (Giordano  &  Fulli,  2011;  Giordano  et  al.,
2011). In the near future, AMR-based meters will become more common in many Eu-
ropean countries (Valtonen et al., 2011) and, for instance, in Finland—where “the tech-
nological advancement of smart metering…is currently one of the best in the world”
(Hierzinger et al., 2013, p. 39)—the new Electricity Market Act4 requires 80% smart
meter penetration by 2014 (Giordano et al., 2011). In theory, the more smart meters are
installed, the more customers are expected to offer controllable load. Consequently,  the
DSOs and TSOs  have better chances to manage peak demand (Neumann, Sioshansi,
Vojdani, & Yee, 2007). So far the problem, however, has been that only the DSOs have
been able to utilize the metering data easily and cost efficiently (Valtonen et al., 2011),
and the situation may stay the same in the near future since, at least in some European
countries, the DSOs are responsible for the smart meter rollouts (Hierzinger et al.,
2013), including Finland.
The cost of the full AMR rollout has estimated to be €565–940 million in Finland
(Giordano et al., 2011). Conversely, the cost of smart meter investment in the EU has
estimated to be €51 billion; however, the implementation of smart meters and the adop-
tion of dynamic tariffs could be worth of €53 billion savings in the EU (Faruqui, Harris,
& Hledik, 2009). Yet studies have too concluded that all-round AMR rollout is not eco-
nomically advisable in premises consuming less than 100 megawatt hours (MWh) a
year (Denda et al., 2009; Energinet.dk, 2009, cited in Hierzinger et al., 2013). The latter
surveys were conducted in Denmark where approximately 50% of all electricity users
had remotely readable meters in 2011 however—that is, the DSOs have been installing
4 66/2009 Act on electricity supply reporting and metering.
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remotely readable meters by choice (ESMA, 2010). The conclusion to draw from the
foregoing contradiction might be that the Danish DSOs are assuming the meters to be
economical in the near future.
Despite the modernization of the grid and the installation of smart meters would make
the grid more stable and energy consumption easier to measure within utilities, it is stat-
ed that “without these feedback tools [that enable customers to regulate their energy
consumption] and additional metering services there is no benefit for the end customer”
(Hierzinger et al., 2013, p. 96). According to their report on smart grid projects in Eu-
rope, Giordano et al. (2011) argue that, at least in demonstration projects, smart meters
are usually combined with demand response programs. DR programs (e.g., EcoreAc-
tion, Energy Demand Research Project, and Google PowerMeter) with feedback tools
that give customers economic incentives have been trialed in the Nordic countries, too,
Figure 2-5: Smart metering infrastructure, exploiting advanced meters, comprehensive
building control, as well as computer-based energy control and user interface with re-
mote maneuverability. Adapted from SmartRegions (2013).
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with good results (Renner et al., 2011). Compared to AMR, in the near future, more ad-
vanced smart meters or advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) integrated with ancil-
lary services might render the status quo obsolete by providing functionalities repre-
sented in Figure 2-5.
The subsequent chapter gives an overview of energy management systems that are ca-
pable of advanced applications. They are already closer to the smart metering infrastruc-
ture (see Figure 2-5) than AMR and could provide sophisticated maneuverability and
energy management.
2.3.3 Home energy management system
Thinking of the overall benefits of electricity consumption and power metering, home
energy management system (HEMS) differentiate from the AMR-based solution with a
number of additional functionalities it provides. As stated earlier, AMR meters are able
to measure energy consumption on an hourly basis whereas HEMS is a system that is
capable of real-time consumption and power metering. In physics, the term power refers
to the amount of energy consumed per unit time whilst energy is the product of power
and time—the integral of power over time, to be precise. The power metering enables
more modern electricity pricing models such as power based tariffs and electricity con-
tracts; consequently, HEMS technologies could enable a vast number of new pricing
principles and tariff structures that mirror the reality better in the physical sense.
In addition to more accurate metering, HEMS would provide useful features to the con-
sumers, as well. HEMS enables more efficient energy usage compared to the current
situation and offers versatile controllability options over home appliances, including
lighting, electric heating, washing machine, and dishwasher. For instance, one setting
that HEMS includes is a home-away switch, thus allowing a resident easily set whether
she is home or absent, and the system automatically switches off unnecessary consumer
electronics when she is not home. HEMS could also feature other home automation
(HA) functionalities such as heating and cooling adjustments as well as water consump-
tion controls. All controls are to be handled through the user interface mounted to a
wall, for example, as well as remotely via smartphone or web interface. HEMS or
somewhat HEMS-alike smart home applications are studied, for instance, by Ju et al.
(2011) and Mäki (2013).
HEMS enable benefitting from smart grid solutions in their full potential. For example,
electric vehicle (EV) charging is easily manageable, own electricity production could be
controlled and managed as well as energy storages, and specific operations could follow
dynamic electricity prices and tariffs through the system. In the U.S., HEMS market is
currently valued already at $1.5 billion and forecasted to be worth over $4 billion by
2017 (Bojanczyk, 2013). The numbers seem inspirational, albeit the U.S. markets are
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not similar to the Nordic markets. The adoption of HEMS solutions in Finland, for ex-
ample, is impeded by the unawareness of its benefits. In Finland, where the prices of
electricity are normally rather low, the consumers are not interested in what appliances
consume a lot, at what time the power consumption hits its highest, etc., thus impeding
the adoption of HEMS and other more modern solution (see e.g., Aalto, 2011).
In spite of the current reluctance toward load curtailment, it is undisputed fact that
spikes in demand result in high generation capacity needs and eventually to high elec-
tricity prices (Bröckl, Vehviläinen, Virtanen, & Keppo, 2011). Furthermore, the form of
electricity generation will also become more fluctuating with renewable energy sources,
thus asserting an increasing need for consumption side flexibility. While HEMS enables
an efficient control over electricity consumption, it can also be beneficiary to consumers
as well, both industrial and residential. HEMS improves energy efficiency and reduces
the amount of waste power that electrical appliances consume even when turned off.
Moreover, when utilized together with demand response, HEMS could provide addi-
tional savings depending on the type of service. Demand response is discussed in detail
in the subsequent section.
One concern around HEMS has been a high purchase price. The estimates vary between
€200 and €600 for the unit and additional costs occur from installation and usage, for
example. This is a major issue impeding the adoption of HEMS solutions, especially
when the expected profits  are probably small.  Even though the HEMS business is  still
developing, the leading home automation companies in the U.S. charge monthly sub-
scription fees between $20 and $60 (€15–44) from over two million total customers
(Bojanczyk, 2013). However, the U.S. markets are different compared to the Nordic
markets, as discussed earlier, but the market potential is increasing as we speak and
while both demand and production patterns are changing when moving toward more
sustainable energy environment.
HEMS solutions would benefit the whole market and its actors in conjunction with de-
mand response, which will be explained in a moment. HEMS enable direct load control
minimizing human intervention, which will probably facilitate the adoption of demand
response. Furthermore, the systems combined with demand response programs could
lead to dynamic pricing models for electricity as well as power based distribution tariffs,
thus making both the market and power system more feasible concerning the future
needs this matter. On the other hand, power-based tariff contracts and dynamic pricing
would probably increase the interest in DR solution, in both the power system and elec-
tricity market vantage points.
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2.3.4 Demand response
The AMR and HEMS technologies enable flexible control of supply and demand. The
role and importance of flexibility of supply and demand have been recognized by elec-
tricity system designers years ago (e.g., Hobbs, Honious, & Bluestein, 1994). Manage-
ment of capacity and demand are not a phenomenon concerning only an energy sector
(e.g., Rohleder & Klassen, 2001); however, the term demand response is probably most
often linked to the electricity sector in particular. In short, DR refers to a load shifting
from critical times to moments of lower consumption. It utilizes a wide range of actions
via smart meters at the customer side (Torriti, Hassan, & Leach, 2010). For the DR pur-
poses, participating customers must be able to receive and respond to signal from a ser-
vice provider. Consequently, Neumann et al. (2007) attest that smart metering must be
implemented in order to take full advantage of DR. Furthermore, DR has the potential,
for instance, to lower the wholesale market prices (Hirst, 2002) and to avoid construc-
tion of expensive peaking generation units that are needed only a few times per year
(U.S. Department of Energy, 2006). The U.S. Depart of Energy defines DR comprehen-
sively as
Changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their normal consumption
patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or to incen-
tive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high wholesale
market prices or when system reliability is jeopardized. (2006, p. 6)
B. Li, Qi, Yan, Sun, and Tang attest “demand response (DR) is one of several most im-
portant ingredients of the emerging smart grid paradigm” (2012, p. 1023). Without DR
electricity demand and price fluctuate throughout the day, as seen in Figure 2-6 (the
chart on the left-hand side). There have been two peak periods both in the price and
consumption of electricity on March 21st, 2013. By looking at the figure, one can tell the
price rose sharply between 3 and 8 o’clock in the morning while demand rose ever more
sharply reaching its peak at 7 a.m. After the morning peak, both the price and demand
fell gradually after the morning leveling off in the afternoon. Toward the evening, they
rose dramatically again until the price reached its peak €96 per megawatt-hour (MWh)
at 7 p.m. demand almost hitting the morning peak 12,000 MWh. After the peak, they
fell toward the midnight. Even if the prices went up due to adverse weather conditions
that increased heating power requirements and reduced the use of hydro power on that
particular day (TE, 2013),  the efficiency of the electric power system will  be better if
fluctuations in demand are small (Albadi & El-Saadany, 2008). Hence, the central idea
of DR is to bring the electricity consumption forward or postpone it in order to flatten
the demand curve (see Figure 2-7) or reduce the peak prices.
Typically, DR requires customer behavioral changes as its benefits are achieved by
stimuli at the consumption end (U.S. Department of Energy, 2006). Interests at the con-
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sumption end may vary; for instance, one can be interested in the reduction of electricity
prices, and the other improvement in energy efficiency. However, all the actions are not
direct DR, for example, energy efficiency is not DR but the utilization of DR could in-
clude applications that enhance energy efficiency. Based upon real data, Figure 2-6 pre-
sents (the right-hand chart) that electricity prices are in relation to demand. Put simply,
generally the greater the demand, the higher the prices (see e.g., Kirschen, 2003). The
exponential increase in the electricity price with greater demand is due to generation
cost that, too, increases exponentially near maximum generation capacity (Albadi & El-
Saadany, 2008). Thus, a reduction of demand could result in a decrease of generation
cost, and further, lower electricity prices as well (Braithwait, Eakin, & Laurits R.
Christensen Associates, 2002).
In order to reduce or shift the actual demand, DR can be exploited in various ways, in-
cluding load adjustments by altering the timing of consumption, level of instantaneous
demand, or total energy consumption (International Energy Agency, 2003). First, cus-
tomers can influence the timing by shifting peak-hour electricity use to off-peak hours
(see Figure 2-7); for example, timing the washing machine and dishwasher to operate at
night would shift more load to off-peak hours. However, this will not be the case with
industrial customers that might experience the diminution of productivity by reschedul-
ing their activities (Albadi & El-Saadany, 2008). Second, they can reduce the level of
instantaneous demand by reducing energy consumption during a particular time-frame
when prices are high without changing their electricity usage during other periods
Figure 2-6: Example of hourly consumption measures and electricity prices (on the left)
in Finland on March 21st, 2013 (data from Nord Pool Spot, 2013). The right-hand
chart, basing on the same data as the latter, illustrates the positive relationship between
price and electricity demanded.
10,000
10,500
11,000
11,500
12,000
12,500
€0
€20
€40
€60
€80
€100
Price Demand
[MWh]
€0
€20
€40
€60
€80
€100
Price Fitted curve
[MWh]
2 ELECTRICITY MARKET AND DEMAND RESPONSE 25
(Herter, McAuliffe, & Rosenfeld, 2007). Finally, total energy consumption can be re-
duced by substituting demand from the DSOs for the customers’ own DG (Sezgen,
Goldman, & Krishnarao, 2007). Moreover, the DR actions can be exploited in numerous
varying ways, as depicted in Figure 2-8.
Demand-side management is referred to as the utilities’ means to reduce the electricity
peak demand in order to reduce energy prices, cut emissions, improve system reliability,
etc. (Malik & Bouzguenda, 2013). There are a vast number of benefits that can be
achieved through implementation of DSM (e.g., Malik & Bouzguenda, 2011; Strbac,
2008); however, it is also argued that, with current wholesale prices, the necessary in-
vestments into the technical infrastructure are too high. Ultimately, the overall potential
of DSM is to improve the energy efficiency and reliability from other than consumption
end (Strbac, 2008), whereas in DR programs—although as being a part of DSM (see
Figure 2-8)—customers are paid incentives for reducing or shifting load (Neumann et
al., 2007).
Different DR programs can be categorized under the price-based programs (PBP) and
incentive-based programs (IBP) (U.S. Department of Energy, 2006). Other classifica-
tions are used as well (e.g., Hirst & Kirby, 2001; Kassakian & Schmalensee, 2011) but
yet the main sub-categories such as time of use program, ancillary services programs,
etc. remain quite the same. According to DOE’s classification, PBP include time-of-use
(TOU), real-time pricing (RTP), and critical peak pricing (CPP) programs. As for IBP,
they include direct load control (DLC) and interruptible/curtailable load programs as
Figure 2-7: A simplified effect of demand response on electricity demand. The demand-
when-actions-taken curve illustrates peak load shaving during a period of time, having
no influence on the total consumption of electricity over that period.
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well as demand bidding, emergency DR, capacity market program, and ancillary ser-
vices market program. Furthermore, DR could be incorporated into electric system
planning and operations at different timescales (see Figure 2-8).
PBP are based on dynamic pricing in which the consumer prices fluctuate following the
market rates (Albadi & El-Saadany, 2008).  In other words,  customers respond only to
price signals instead of on-demand control commands from DR service provider. Bor-
rowing definitions from the U.S. Department of Electricity (2006), in TOU the electrici-
ty is priced separately for different time periods, for instance, for a 24 hour day or simp-
ly the peak and the off-peak pricing. In RTP program, the consumer prices follow the
real wholesale market prices and consumers can be notified of the price fluctuations on
a day-ahead or hour-ahead basis. Moreover, RTP programs are potentially the most effi-
cient DR programs (Borenstein, Jaske, & Rosenfeld, 2002; Goldman, Hopper, Sezgen,
Moezzi, & Bharvirkar, 2004). CPP program is combinations of TOU and RTP pro-
grams. They are basically TOU programs, but the normal peak prices are replaced with
much higher critical peak prices. In addition to three foregoing types, Albadi and El-
Saadany (2008) present two more: extreme day pricing (EDP) and extreme day CPP
(ED-CPP) which both are, however, quite similar to CPP. The next paragraph gives an
overview on incentive-based DR option. Comprehensive, in-depth definitions are given
in Appendix 1 for both PBP and IBP.
Incentive-based DR options can be placed in two categories: classical IBP and market
based IBP (Albadi & El-Saadany, 2008). Yet again borrowing from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Electricity (2006), the following definitions of several programs are provided.
In Figure 2-8,  DLC is positioned at  the bottom of the timescale which means it  is  uti-
lized roughly around the time when the actual electricity is delivered. Hence, DLC
means managing a customer’s load on short notice. Put differently, it is a program by
which a DR responsible party remotely controls—by shutting down or cycling—
residential or small customer’s load. Emergency DR program and interruptible services
address economic dispatch meaning the short-term determination of the optimal elec-
tricity output to meet the system load economically and reliably (Energy Policy Act of
2005, 2005). Emergency DR is founded upon incentive payments that are paid to cus-
tomers if they reduce their load during possible reserve shortfall periods (U.S.
Department of Energy, 2006).
Interruptible service and demand bidding programs are typically offered to large cus-
tomers. In interruptible service, a rate discount is provided as equivalent to load reduc-
tion during system contingencies. Conversely, failure to curtail could result in penalties
being assessed. As for demand bidding, it is kind of a curtailment program, too. In de-
mand bidding (or buyback) programs customers—mainly large who consume a large
amount of electricity—offer bids to restrict their loads; bids are usually based on market
prices.
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Figure 2-8: Categories of various DR options and the role of DR in DSM. Electric sys-
tem planning and operation activities are represented in the middle. System planning is
often a long-term planning in which concerns over the energy efficiency are being dealt
with; load management (i.e., DR) usually takes place nearer to the time of delivery.
Adapted from the U.S. Department of Energy (2006, p. 15), Albadi and El-Saadany
(2008, p. 1990), and NERC (2011, p. 11).
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In addition to operational planning, capacity market programs and ancillary services
market programs are utilized. Both are load curtailment programs by which system ca-
pacity is enhanced. In capacity market program customers typically receive notice of
load restriction requirements, and they are paid for offering load curtailments. In ancil-
lary services market program customers bid load curtailments which then are either ac-
cepted by TSO or DSO or not; customers are paid if their bids are accepted, and if TSO
or DSOs need to curtail the payments may be higher. (U.S. Department of Energy,
2006.)
On the whole, the target of DR is to enable active participation of commercial, industri-
al, and residential consumers to manage the balance between supply and demand, to
provide benefits to power systems, to promote environmental sustainability, and to low-
er the cost of electricity.  A vast amount of controllable load can be achieved by aggre-
gating a number of small customers into larger units. For example, a DSO could remote-
ly control the electric floor heating of every flat in an apartment house as a single unit to
curtail load during peak hours. As for DR, it would be more lucrative if DR responsible
party  (i.e.,  TSO,  DSO,  or  supplier)  sent  curtailment  requests  on  which  to  respond  in-
stead of consumers adjusting their demand and making predictions on their available
flexibility on their own. A provision for responding the request would be paid on a con-
tractual or voluntary basis depending on the DR service type and, correspondingly, the
mechanism could base on either price or volume signals, or both.
2.4 The value of DR
2.4.1 Assessing the value
The benefits of DR are discussed in a general manner above. From the point of view of
companies which operate in the market and of business, generalized benefits work as if
the starting point. Companies need more focused targets on the benefits in order to build
a strategy. Moreover, companies should be able to identify their customers, and direct
value propositions accordingly. In their book, Strategy Maps: Converting Intangible
Assets into Tangible Outcomes, Kaplan and Norton (2004) provide a tool for compa-
nies’ executives to assess their strategy. Kaplan and Norton state clearly that “strategy is
based on a differentiated customer value propositions…Strategy requires a clear articu-
lation of targeted customer segments and the value proposition required to please them”
(2004, p. 10).
It must be noted that this study, however, does not strive for addressing strategic issues
as such. Instead, defining the value proposition is a major single task in the forthcoming
value blueprint mapping. Adner formulates the value proposition as “a promise” and,
further, “a vision of the new value that your innovation efforts will create, as well as
who this value will be created for” (2012, p. 84). The value, in turn, means the results
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customers receive with relation to the total costs they pay (Heskett, Jones, Loveman,
Sasser, & Schlesinger, 1994). Neither the results nor the costs include only tangible as-
sets, but also intangible such as value experienced by an individual person. Consequent-
ly, Heskett et al. (1997, p. 12) provide the customer value equation according to which
customer value is determined as follows:
ܿݑݏݐ݋݉݁ݎݒ݈ܽݑ݁ = ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐݏ+ ݁ݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ
݌ݎ݅ܿ݁ + ܽܿܿ݁ݏݏܿ݋ݏݐݏ .         (1)
In the customer value equation, perceived experience quality and access costs depend
on individual (Heskett et al., 1997, pp. 40–42), thus making it qualitative in that sense.
Results  and  price  should  not  be  comprehended as  unambiguous  either,  albeit  they  are
more concrete than the latter. Although the reasoning what is a value and how it is cre-
ated is not in the scope of this study, it must be realized that various customers have dif-
ferent expectations of products or services. For instance, in the context of this study,
environmental conscious people may be willing to invest in DR without expecting re-
turn on their investment, whereas some may be pursuing merely economic benefits.
2.4.2 NABC
The acronym “NABC” stands for need, approach, benefits per costs, and competition
(Carlson & Wilmot, 2006, p. 10). The NABC method is a tool to analyze and develop
value propositions quickly for products, services, or projects. NABC is as if the way of
rendering complex ideas and thoughts simple language. Carlson and Wilmot state that a
good value proposition addresses the following four fundamentals:
What is the market need? What is your approach to addressing this need? What are
the benefits per costs of your approach? How do those benefits per costs compare
with the competition? (2006, p. 10.)
Now, what is the NABC of DR? Since this thesis is normative by nature covering vari-
ous aspects and potential beneficiaries of DR, the approach is hard to describe. Moreo-
ver,  the  approach  depends  on  the  view  on  end  customer,  to  whom  the  DR  service  is
eventually offered. In fact, providing an approach how to implement DR successfully
would require that clarity exists toward this subject. In reality, confusion and uncertain-
ty exist; thus, the purpose of this study is to ease the unawareness to some extent. Con-
sequently, the benefits and especially the needs of DR are discussed herein in detail, and
the approach and competition are yet to come, provided as part of the study outcomes
hereinafter.
Initially, the benefits of smart grid for different market members and the environment
are well-studied and published (e.g., Heinen, Elzinga, Kim, & Yuichi, 2011;
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International Energy Agency, 2011; Malik & Bouzguenda, 2013; Sioshansi, 2012). In
addition, the present electric power system infrastructure was not designed to meet the
challenges of the twenty-first century (Depuru et al., 2011; Gellings, 2011; Hammons,
2008; International Energy Agency, 2011; SGMM, 2010; Wang & Lu, 2013). Likewise,
“current trends in energy supply and use are patently unsustainable—economically, en-
vironmentally, and socially” (Tanaka, 2011, p. 1). For example, the EU has set the ener-
gy and emission targets for 2020 to address the sustainability challenges. In the EU’s
climate and energy policy, so-called “20-20-20” targets aim at reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, increasing the use of renewable energy resources, and improving energy ef-
ficiency (European Union, 2007). Consequently, there are a plethora of issues to ad-
dress, but also substantiated advantages from smart grid technologies which make tack-
ling the issues worth trying.
DR is one way to deploy smart grid technologies and both economic and environmental
advantages of DR are studied and published likewise (e.g., Albadi & El-Saadany, 2008;
Faruqui, 2007; Hurley, Peterson, & Whited, 2013; Sioshansi, 2012; Torriti et al., 2010).
DR is most beneficial especially on peak periods and when capacity is scarce (Neumann
et al., 2007). The benefits, however, are quite different between regions with liberalized
energy markets and markets where the vertical integration of the supplier and utility is
allowed (Heffner, 2009). Moreover, before there is anything concrete to gain advantage
from, the fundamentals have to be in place. One of these fundamentals is smart metering
(Neumann et al., 2007) that would enable customers access to reduced energy prices as
well as benefits from grid operations saving (Braithwait & Hansen, 2011). As stated be-
fore, this study focuses on the Nordic markets and Finland in particular. That is, firstly,
the vertical integration is prohibited by authorities, and secondly, the smart meters are
already, or will be, installed in a large number of household in the Nordic countries and
Europe (Hierzinger et al., 2013).
Investments in DR have a potential to impact beneficially on several participant in the
markets in various ways. However, either the benefits do not occur for every participant
or at least they appear unevenly over the different actors (Heffner, 2009). For example,
consumers might have vested interest in controlling their load, but this could vitiate the
suppliers’ and DSOs’ plans and profits. Put simply, profit to one can be a cost to anoth-
er. The issue is referred to as conflict of interests, and it is probably one matter hinder-
ing the adoption of DR applications (Belonogova et al., 2011). Therefore, it is crucial to
observe the balance between benefits and costs in valuing the effects of DR on different
actors. Furthermore, the conflict of interests mainly occurs when a participant is en-
deavoring toward the short-term (less than 48 hours) benefits such as critical peak load
shedding.
In the short term, reducing the loads on critical peak periods can have significant influ-
ence on wholesale market prices benefitting all electricity consumers (Faruqui, 2007).
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In regions where DR is exploited, it generally reduces the wholesale market prices, in-
cluding day-ahead and intra-day markets (Heffner, 2009). In addition, the load reduction
that is achieved by the actions of consumers can also improve reliability by providing a
valuable resource to DSOs at  times of generation, transmission, or distribution system
capacity constraints (Braithwait & Hansen, 2011). Quite many DR program actually
impact on the short-term consumption peaks or market price formation, as depicted ear-
lier in Figure 2-8. Albeit some market-based programs, such as demand bidding or
emergency DR, can reduce short-term peak loads resulting in avoided or reduced bal-
ancing costs, they can actually result in much bigger savings in the long term due to de-
ferred investments in the transmission and distribution infrastructures (International
Energy Agency, 2003; U.S. Department of Energy, 2006).
As for the long-term impacts, the implementation and utilization of DR will eventually
lead to a lower need to invest in peaking generation, reserve margins, as well as trans-
mission and distribution capacity inflicting a reduction in the price of electricity (Albadi
& El-Saadany, 2008; Faruqui, 2007; Heffner, 2009). In addition to reduced costs, an-
other important aspect is the environment. The perception that DR only shifts electricity
usage, rather than decreases it, is profound as shifting does not have much of an effect
on energy efficiency or emissions. However, King and Delurey (2005) examined this
issue and went through several cases to discover that DR decreases overall energy con-
sumption in nearly all cases, even if energy efficiency was not pursued. Furthermore,
Chardon et al. (2008) ended up with the same kind of results in their more recent study
concerning  the  broad  economic  and  environmental  potentials  of  DR for  the  EU.  Con-
versely, Nemtzow et al. (2007) note that DR can also increase electricity usage in some
circumstances, and therefore DSM projects that address both DR and energy efficiency
would be more beneficial as a whole.
The EU’s 20-20-20 targets and other drivers toward more sustainable energy consump-
tion and production will increase the penetration of renewable energy sources into the
grid. As a consequence, a large amount of renewable energy causes intermittency in the
grid. In some extent, DR—among the expanded European transmission grid and in-
creased back-up capacity—is compulsory in order to manage the higher levels of inter-
mittency (European Climate Foundation, 2010).
One may have noticed that the benefits are discussed but not the costs. The reason of
which the benefit-to-cost ratio is not discussed in detail is the difficulty of the calcula-
tions.  It  is  extremely  hard  to  predict  what  would  be  the  benefits  of  DR for  all  market
players. The task can be even harder concerning a fully functioning smart grid where
the benefits come from multiple sources, including DR. According to Hashmi (2011),
the implementation of DR can be one of the major economic challenges in liberalized
energy markets. Moreover, Hashmi states the estimation of the benefits and costs of DR
or smart grid are a tough task, and potential savings are “almost impossible to count” in
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Finland (2011, p. 60). The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) (2011, p. 1-4) esti-
mated that the benefit-to-cost ratio of a fully functioning smart grid for the U.S. electric
power sector would be somewhere in the range of 2.8–6.0. EPRI considered the project-
ed benefits and costs over the 20-year period (2010–2030), but the market structure is
different in the U.S. Hence, neither the benefits nor costs are comparable to the Nordic
countries as such.
Now that the benefits and costs have been discussed, the most difficult question is: what
are the market needs for DR? For instance, system operators can improve the reliability
of the system through DR utilization. DR is clearly useful especially at times of genera-
tion, transmission, or distribution system capacity constraints (Braithwait & Hansen,
2011). DSOs’ attraction for load control rests upon minimizing the investment costs on
one hand, as well as the outage, loss, and maintenance costs on the other in the long
term (Lakervi & Holmes, 1995). In actuality, DR interactions have the potential to re-
duce transmission investments as well as back-up generation requirements by up to thir-
ty percent (European Climate Foundation, 2010).
Besides, large scale power blackouts could have significant adverse impacts both eco-
nomically and socially (e.g., Aurora, 2005; Daniel, 2012; Hooper, 2003). Conversely,
according  to  November  (see  Table  4-1,  p.  59),  the  most  important  benefits  that  DR
could provide to the TSO are short-time activation and response. Short-time activation
and response concerning balancing power would mean more effective management of
the grid stability when imbalances occur than with current back-up generation units.
On the other hand, electricity suppliers could improve their power balance management,
leading  to  monetary  savings  by  the  exploitation  of  DR  (Valtonen,  Partanen,  &
Belonogova, 2012). Basically, the suppliers are interested in minimizing the daily elec-
tricity costs (Belonogova et al., 2011). The costs minimization includes two aspects:
obtaining the minimum daily energy costs and cutting future balancing costs. First, the
suppliers are able to gain more profit from the electricity they sell by minimizing their
own electricity costs. Obtaining the minimum daily energy costs requires customers’
load control. Second, the suppliers face major financial losses from incorrectly foresee-
ing the consumers’ consumption patterns. When customers consume more than predict-
ed the loser is the supplier since electricity contracts are generally flat tariffs by nature.
Whether it is about the DSOs’ or suppliers’ interests in question, the end consumer must
be made to participate. From the end consumer point of view, criteria or motives to par-
ticipate in a DR program could be financial, environmental, societal, pressure, etc.
Whatever the truth, the financial vantage point seems to be one of the main priorities
whether the consumer is residential, industrial, or commercial (Heiskanen, Matschoss,
Kuusi, et al., 2012). Consequently, the overall price of electricity should reduce one way
or the other. In fact, as Boisvert et al. (2002) attest, overall electricity price reduction is
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eventually expected. Additionally, enhancing the ability to utilize DR could benefit the
whole markets operate more efficiently and satisfactorily (Jazayeri et al., 2005;
Kirschen, 2003). Albeit the DR need and benefits are largely studied for vertically inte-
grated utilities (e.g., in the U.S.), the need and positive impact on energy price are also
substantiated in regions with liberalized wholesale markets (U.S. Department of Energy,
2006). Indeed, DR would benefit eventually the end consumers as well because of more
efficient utilization of the available infrastructure (Albadi & El-Saadany, 2008).
Furthermore, investing in DR can be seen as an investment in the environment in the
long run (Nemtzow et al., 2007). Additionally, the EU’s 20-20-20 targets require more
RES to be installed in the grid by the year 2020 (European Union, 2007). Now, this will
increase the generation capacity requirements since “wind and solar PV tend to operate
at part load relative to full rated capacity for much of the year” (European Climate
Foundation, 2010, p. 57). That is, both wind and PV would require a total of 200
terawatt-hours (TWh) capacity toward 100 TWh demand, namely the generated energy
relies heavily on wind and sun, naturally. Nevertheless, the integration of RES could be
eased via DR exploitation (Hanser, Madjarov, Katzenstein, & Chang, 2011), leading to
more secure future grid.
2.4.3 Value proposition
In light of the preceding discussion, who ultimately needs to adopt the DR service for
Table 2-3: Value propositions of DR for several actors in deregulated electricity mar-
kets.
End customer Value proposition
DSO Controllable loads for enhancing network management (faults, capacity, feeding, and
arrangements).
DSO can use DR for alternative for capacity building in some cases. In fault situa-
tions loads could be restored or maintained with criticality information.
Supplier
(retailer)
Balance settlement correction, regulating power market, frequency control market.
With more dynamic acting of production, storing, and consumption of electricity,
energy retailer can correct balance errors with actively using DR service.
Consumer Possibility to sell green energy to markets, compensation of allowing loads to be
controlled, lower price of energy.
Green energy: functionality needed to support and maximize this. Compensation
from supplier and DSO (collected and paid by service provider). Additionally con-
sumer could be offered low cost power for example for EV loading. Aim of this
would be to improve production and consumption balance.
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this kind of business to thrive? Who is the target of the value proposition? The consid-
erable actors are the DSO, TSO, supplier, and consumer that would be able to gain from
the cumulative (i.e., aggregated) impact of small savings per consumer (see Table 2-3).
Moreover, the savings of these actors will mirror eventually lower electricity prices on
the  consumer  side  as  well  (Braithwait  et  al.,  2002).  The  major  distinction  among  the
provided actors is competition as the DSOs’ and TSO’s profits are regulated and limited
vis-à-vis the suppliers’ that operate under competition legislation. Therefore, the suppli-
ers’ business is clearly keener in terms of competition and they have to search for strat-
egies to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals. Reciprocally, as for the DSOs
and TSOs, they do not compete against each other but their major concerns lie in power
quality and development of distribution and transmission system, respectively.
Indeed, the development of distribution system may appear minor at first glance, but it
is far from that. Figure 2-9 below presents the price formation of electricity of a residen-
tial consumer. In the figure, there are two types of consumers illustrated: first, column
(a) illustrates a consumer connected to other than electric heating (e.g., district heating)
and second, column (b) a consumer that exploits electric heating (b). On the basis of this
chart, it is clear that the share of DSO is almost fivefold compared to the retailer’s share,
at least on the residential side. The DSO’s share is partly explained by high infrastruc-
ture costs.
The price of electricity can be segregated in three categories: tax (including VAT),
transmission and distribution, and energy. Although the tax system is not in the focus of
this study, it has to be mentioned that value added tax (VAT) has been bound to the en-
ergy price with a fixed percentage whereas tax depends on the consumption. Hence,
taxes cause approximately a third of the costs of the residential consumer’s electricity
(see Figure 2-9).
Furthermore, DSO’s share against TSO’s equivalent seems quite substantial concerning
residential consumers, as seen in Figure 2-9. This is an essential point when considering
how to get the consumer active in DR projects. The retailer, in turn, seems to enjoy a
slight share, mirroring the tight competition that has been taken place in electricity re-
tailer business. However, the retailer that purchases electricity from the market can con-
trol the purchase price (i.e., purchasing at cheap hours).
Taking the preceding discussion together, DSO and electricity supplier are most poten-
tial beneficiaries from DR. Of course, a ‘win-win-win’ situation must be attained in or-
der to achieve prosperity and particularly the consumers should be engaged in DR (see
Table 2-3). The issue concerning the consumers is that the benefits for them are hard to
point out. The consumers do not feel a need for DR. Probably it is just too soon for the
consumers to be interested in DR.
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Consequently, the economic benefits for the suppliers are considered as direct since
they are gained from the minimization of the electricity costs. Hence, the value proposi-
tion promises more accurate control over the customers’ consumption. Moreover, DR
would allow more accurate forecasts on the day-ahead and intra-day market, as well as
reduced employment of the balancing market. Additionally, customers will receive in-
centive payments for complying with the supplier’s load control commands or requests,
and enjoy lower expenses for electricity they consume. Now, according to this vision
both the supplier and consumer draw economic benefits from the DR service implemen-
tation creating a win-win situation.
Instead, the economic benefits of the regulated actors are gained generally from some-
thing that does not occur; for instance, if DSOs can avoid power losses or defer invest-
ments in the grid. Hence, the economic benefits of the regulated actors are somewhat
indirect by nature, resulting in a different approach to the value proposition. Given that,
the extent to which DR could bear economic value for the system operators is based on
more accurate controls over frequency fluctuation and peak loads, enabling deferred in-
vestments in the transmission and distribution networks as well as manageable infra-
structure for large-scale integration of RES. Ultimately these saving would mirror
changes in the price of electricity, providing a win-win situation for both the consumers
and system operators.
Figure 2-9: Electricity costs distribution in the residential sector. The column on the
left (a) represents a situation in which a consumer utilizes some other heating method
than electric heating (€153 per MWh) and the right column (b) illustrates a case where
electric heating is being exploited (€126 per MWh). Adapted from Energiamark-
kinavirasto (2013).
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In conclusion, Chapter 2 presented the generalized structure of the current electricity
system, both economic and technical. The principles of the Nordic electricity markets
are also discussed. The discussion provided views on three significant market places,
namely day-ahead Elspot, intra-day Elbas, as well as after-delivery balancing markets.
Founding on this basic knowledge on the markets and system, the chapter afforded
timely outlook on the smart grid, including relevant technologies and demand response.
All this information is necessary in order to generate the value proposition of DR. In
regard to DR business ecosystem, the value propositions are essentials. Moreover, every
value proposition includes the vision of reduced electricity prices at the consumer end.
Indeed, lower electricity prices are crucial, since the viable value proposition has to be
able to provide a win-win-win business ecosystem.  However, the value propositions
clearly address different issues for TSO, DSO, and supplier. Consequently, conflict of
interests may arise if economic and technical constraints of other participants are not
addressed in exploitation of DR recourses.
The next chapter provides a comprehensive literature review on the business ecosystem
concept. This and the next chapter establish a backbone for further discussion on the
above mentioned conflict of interests and DR business ecosystem. Building on the
business ecosystem concept, Chapter 5 endeavors to identify issues hindering the
emergence of DR and overcome these issues in order to present insights how the value
propositions could become reality.
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3 BUSINESS ECOSYSTEM
3.1 Ecosystem perspective
3.1.1 Analogy
The word ‘ecosystem’ comes from the words ecology and system5. In the area of ecolo-
gy, ecosystem is defined, for example, as “a system formed by the interaction of a
community of organisms with its environment” (Costello, 1995, p. 424). That is, a bio-
logical ecosystem comprises a wide diversity of interdependent species that contribute
to the ecosystem’s overall wellbeing. Despite biology, or ecology, has directly little to
do with the topic of this thesis,  advanced analysis of this analogy is imperative to en-
hance one’s knowledge about how ecosystems operate in the business world (Iansiti &
Levien, 2004a).
Ecosystem metaphor is relatively young in the doctrine of business management, and it
started to show up in the academic literature in the early 1990s. Before actual emer-
gence in the business context, the term ‘ecosystem’ was coined in the area of econom-
ics.  In his book, Bionomics: Economy as Ecosystem, Michael Rothschild (1990) argues
that key natural phenomena are central at business life, too. He suggests that firms func-
tion as biological organisms and industries as species of an ecosystem—the ecosystem
in which survival is a reward for efficiency and, by contrast, extinction will occur in ret-
ribution for inefficiency. In the business world, things are quite the same—companies
that cannot fully exploit their scarce resources are generally bankrupted by inefficiency.
Moreover, survival in an ecosystem depends on company’s assets and their usage. Roth-
schild put it this way:
An organization is defined by its technology and by its associations with its suppli-
ers, competitors, and customers. From a bionomic perspective, organisms and or-
ganizations are nodes in networks of relationships. (1990, p. 213)
The corresponding analogy between nature and business is drawn also by James Moore
(1996, p. 26) who argues that interacting organizations and individuals are the organ-
isms of the business world. Iansiti and Levien (2004a) demonstrate an ecosystem ob-
served in nature. They talk about the coastal ecosystem of the Pacific Northwest where
5 Etymology: ecosystem comes from eco + system, prefix ‘eco-‘ denoting ecology (Isaacs, Daintith, &
Martin, 1991, p. 108).
3 BUSINESS ECOSYSTEM 38
sea otters help to main the healthy ecosystem by consuming vast amounts of sea ur-
chins. In their seminal contribution, “Strategy as ecology”, Iansiti and Levien (2004a)
explain that decrease in the sea otter population affects negatively on coastal fish and
other organisms hindering near-shore productivity (i.e., it makes the ecosystem un-
healthier). Put differently, the lower the sea otter population, the more sea urchins
which, in turn, overgrazes a variety food web supporting invertebrates and plants dam-
aging the coastal ecosystem.
Sea otters stand only for a small part of the biomass of the ecosystem. Nonetheless, the
otters represent a paramount role in it and have a significant influence on the entity. In
the business world, the situation is somewhat the same. That is, a keystone6 company
has a vital role in a business ecosystem concerning the ecosystem as a whole, it as if
holds the other ecosystem elements in place (Iansiti & Levien, 2004b). Furthermore,
due to the keystone’s behavior, some individual member of the ecosystem suffers. For
example, in the sea otter case, the sea urchins get eaten by the otters lowering the urchin
population which, in turn, betters the near-shore productivity. Especially noteworthy,
however, is the overall health of the ecosystem that improves on some individual’s suf-
fering. (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a.) In addition, organisms and species contribute not only
to the ecosystem but the changing ecosystem contributes to the survival and success of
its members as well (Iansiti & Levien, 2004b).
3.1.2 Business domain
Now, when there is understanding about how the things work in nature, the understand-
ing can be used as a baseline while describing how they are in the business world. The
term ecosystem was linked to economics in 1990, but among business and management
practitioners the concept of ‘business ecosystem’ was introduced a few years later (J. F.
Moore, 1993). Since its introduction, study concerning business ecosystem has in-
creased tremendously, as shown in Figure 3-1. The data in the figure has been structured
from the Web of Knowledge database using the search term ‘ecosystem*’ in the topic
and limiting the search to ‘business’ and ‘management’ research domains7. The figure
speaks the same language with Adner (2006) who claims that innovation ecosystems8
have become a central element in the firms’ growth strategies in a wide range of indus-
tries. The rationale for this lies in the ecosystems’ capability allowing firms to create
greater value together than no single firm could have created alone (Adner, 2006), or the
6 A  key  member  in  the  case  of  business  ecosystem  as  well  as  a  vital  species  in  biological  ecosystems
(Iansiti & Levien, 2004a). The keystone is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.1.3.
7 Web of Knowledge database on www.webofknowledge.com. Number of hits (n = 135).
8 Adner talks about innovation ecosystems instead of business ecosystems; however, the constructs are
used quite interchangeably in the literature although differences have been recognized.
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value could be even “greater than the sum of its parts” (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002, p.
58).
Consequently, what are these ‘ecosystems’ in business domain? In the Moore’s business
ecosystem, “companies co-evolve capabilities around a new innovation: they work co-
operatively and competitively to support new products, satisfy customer needs, and
eventually incorporate the next round of innovations” (1993, p. 76). The foregoing defi-
nition is quite generic, yet a unified definition is still somewhat nonexistent in the litera-
ture due to characteristics of different businesses. In spite of the lack of a unified defini-
tion, literature review reveals that the most of the scholars, however, share a common
thread in their conceptualizations.
In the business world context, ‘ecosystem’ can be considered variously or loosely de-
fined; nevertheless, in management research, the metaphor is often illustrated as a net-
work of actors that are bound together through collective operations to produce a holis-
tic entity offering value for customers and satisfying their needs (Adner, 2006; Bahrami
& Evans, 1995; Ginsberg et al., 2010; Iansiti & Levien, 2004a; Lusch, 2011; J. F.
Moore, 1993; Teece, 2007). In several contexts, business ecosystem is described to in-
clude actors such customers, market intermediaries, complementary product and service
providers, suppliers, and the firm at issue itself (Adner, 2006; e.g., J. F. Moore, 1996;
Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005). As stated earlier, characteristics vary through businesses;
further, business ecosystems may also be seen constituting financing, trade associations,
standard bodies, labor union, governmental institutions, universities and research insti-
Figure 3-1: The number of published items and citation concerning ecosystem in rela-
tion to business management research domain. Data structured on July 17, 2013 from
Web of Knowledge.
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tutes, and the judiciary (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Bahrami & Evans, 1995; Iyer &
Davenport, 2008; Y.-R. Li, 2009; Meyer, Gaba, & Colwell, 2005; Zacharakis,
Shepherd, & Coombs, 2003).
While business ecosystem is the most commonly used concept within the structured da-
ta used in this thesis—constituting over a third of the sample9—there are a number of
similar constructs found to describe the ecosystem in the literature. Especially during
the present millennium the number of publications has increased vastly (see Figure 3-1)
and different ecosystem concepts—such as industrial ecosystem (Desrochers, 2002;
Sharma & Henriques, 2005; Shrivastava, 1995), innovation ecosystem (Adner &
Kapoor, 2010; Adner, 2006, 2012), product ecosystem (Frels, Shervani, & Srivastava,
2003), service ecosystem (Lusch, Vargo, & Tanniru, 2010; Lusch, 2011), and technolo-
gy (Adomavicius, Bockstedt, Gupta, & Kauffman, 2007; Cusumano & Gawer, 2002;
Gawer & Cusumano, 2008) and technology-based ecosystem (Santos & Eisenhardt,
2005)—have been introduced (see Figure 3-2). Furthermore, one rationale behind the
study around these systems is that the “benefits…are real and well publicized”10 (Adner,
2006, pp. 99–100).
Ecosystems can be seen to have some analogies with a business model concept, too. The
business model is described, for example, as “the rationale of how an organization cre-
ates, delivers, and captures value” (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010, p. 14), and hence the
business model assesses the value logic at the firm level. An ecosystem is a cross indus-
try network of the producers of many different types of goods and services that can be
combined into different combinations (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a), and hence ecosystems
transcend a single industry. For instance, Apple transcends such industries as communi-
cation industries, consumer electronics, information, and personal computer (PC) (J. F.
Moore, 1993). That is, an ecosystem perspective distinguishes a network level evalua-
tion, planning, and strategy construction although it is not a step-by-step model to build
a superior ecosystem. Notwithstanding the wider lens of the ecosystem perspective in
respect of the business model, it is notable that business ecosystems often have a central
focus on a core firm, either a focal firm (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Teece, 2007), a central
hub or a keystone firm (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a), or a platform leader (Cusumano &
Gawer, 2002).
Thomas and Autio (2012) argue that the value logic and the locus of coordination are
the main differentiators between the various ecosystem models. Efficiency and flexibil-
9 Sample comprises 135 articles. The three most common variants were the ‘business ecosystem’ (݊ =46), ‘innovation ecosystem’ (݊ = 29), and ‘technology ecosystem’ (݊ = 4).
10 For example, platform leadership (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Gawer & Cusumano, 2008; Hopkins,
2011), keystone strategies (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a, 2004b), open innovation (Chesbrough & Appleyard,
2007; Chesbrough, 2003), and value networks (Lusch, 2011; Vargo & Lusch, 2011).
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ity are seen as key sources of value in the business ecosystem. According to Moore’s
(1993, p. 76) definition, cooperation and evolving reciprocally with one another are es-
sential in the business ecosystem, too. Iansiti and Levien (2004a) talk about the business
ecosystem as well; however, they have slightly different approach. Just like in Moore’s
work, the locus of coordination is the firm, yet the twosome introduces value dominator
called ‘keystone’ and use platform level coordination instead of the focal firm.
As shown in Figure 3-2, an innovation ecosystem, conversely, emphasizes innovation
and externalities as the primary scope of value. Innovation ecosystems are well-known
through the works of Adner (2006) and Adner and Kapoor (2010) and their study on
bottleneck technologies in the semiconductor lithography ecosystem (Adner & Kapoor,
2007; Kapoor & Adner, 2007). Additionally, Adner’s most recent and seminal work—
used one of the backbones of this thesis later on both the theoretical and empirical stag-
es—The Wide Lens: A New Strategy for Innovation, discusses the topic in great detail
and propose a few unprecedented real-life examples. Nevertheless, innovation ecosys-
tems vary substantially in complements and innovation approach from other concepts,
leading to a paramount ecosystem performance as a whole. For innovation ecosystems,
it is crucial that a firm identifies all the complementors11 required—for the firm at issue
as well as for each of the firm’s intermediaries—to move the offer forward to the end
consumer (Adner, 2006).
11 ‘Complementor’ is an abbreviated version of the longer ‘developer of a complementary product or ser-
vice’. Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) introduced the role of complementor in Co-opetition.
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Finally, the third box in Figure 3-2 contain a technology ecosystem, i.e., industrial eco-
system, that draws its benefits from complementarity and innovation as well (Gawer &
Cusumano, 2008), but technology ecosystems include a population of interrelated tech-
nologies that influence the evolution and development of one another, and further, have
specific technology roles depending on a context (Adomavicius et al., 2007). Moreover,
unlike innovation ecosystems, the locus of coordination of technology ecosystems is the
platform. In their scientific paper, “The elements of platform leadership”, Cusumano
and  Gawer  (2002)  discuss  the  Intel’s  and  Microsoft’s  ecosystems  as  well  as  Cisco’s
complex technology ecosystem emphasizing externalities as the primary scope of value.
With all the resemblances between business and natural ecosystems, there are also a
number of distinctions between the two. To begin with, nature integrates a cyclic pro-
cess. Simply put, plants grow on photosynthesis and external nutrients, herbivores feed
on plants, carnivores feed on herbivores, scavengers feed on dead herbivores and carni-
vores, and finally decomposers feed on dead tissue and waste (i.e., plants, herbivores,
carnivores, and scavengers), thus producing external nutrients to the plants. More often
than not, humans, and thus businesses, work linearly. That is, the process begins with
raw material acquisition, leading in general to production of goods. The production is
followed by supply and distribution, in consequence of which consumers may use the
goods. Unlike in nature, the used goods are seldom recycled but disposed of on the
dump.
Furthermore, every element must win in a viable business ecosystem in the business
world. Imagine, for example, a case where a car manufacturer sells its cars to a retailer
who, in turn, resells the cars to consumers. Now, the retailer has to put purchase price
premium (i.e., sales margin) on a vehicle to do viable business in the long run. The pur-
chase price premium is essential to the retailers since they have to pay the rents, sala-
ries, electricity, etc. Moreover, the customers cannot ‘win’ without the retailers. They
cannot benefit from car purchases if there is no place to buy one. In other words, if one
element in the ecosystem loses everybody loses. However, it is hard to see how a ga-
zelle wins when lions feed on it, albeit every other species win. One more distinction to
be mentioned is that species are seldom cannibals, whereas firms are constantly trying
to edge any other companies out which operate within the same industry. The cannibals
are referred to as “wannabes” by Cusumano and Gawer (2002, p. 52).
Yet another difference concerns heredity. While biological organisms pass on of quali-
ties genetically from one generation to another, firms do not inherit the characteristics of
their parent companies—at least not as surely as biological organisms do. Through he-
redity and natural selection, some species have been able to evolve. Obviously compa-
nies evolve, too, but generally through innovation. That is, being a spin-off does not
guarantee the success of a business, even if the parent company was successful. Howev-
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er, a company might live forever if it manages to keep pace with innovation and envi-
ronmental change, whereas all organisms eventually die.
After all, it must be noted that the whole natural (or business) ecosystem is an artificial
model, a human concept about the relations among species (firms). Moreover, Adner
argues “management frameworks in general, and strategy frameworks in particular,
should be approached with suspicion” (2006, p. 106). However, the ecosystem concepts
are useful abstractions and “to be perfect, an analogy would have to be so simplistic that
it would offer little real insight” (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a, p. 72).
3.1.3 Actors and their roles
Keystone firms are potentially the most significant actors in business ecosystems. A
keystone plays a crucial role as laying the foundation for other companies, striving to
improve the overall health of their ecosystem. Ecosystem productivity may increase due
to the keystone’s activities, for example, simplifying the complex network of actors and
making it easier for the firms to create connections with one another in the network.
Conversely, in many cases, the whole ecosystem may collapse if the keystone is re-
moved. (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a.) The keystone is also referred to as platform leader
that direct industry-wide innovation toward a robust ecosystem contributed by separate-
ly developed pieces of technology (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002), or ecosystem leader
that encourages actors to work cooperatively to continue improving the complete offer
(J. F. Moore, 1993). As mentioned in the sea otter case (pp. 37–38), in spite of the key-
stone having a greater power in the ecosystem (J. F. Moore, 1993)—and hence, claims a
disproportionate rate of value within it (Iyer & Davenport, 2008)—the keystone stands
only for a small part of the ‘biomass’ of the ecosystem (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a).
A keystone of being a keystone is the aforementioned platform that complementors and
other  actors  can  rely  on  while  developing  their  own  offerings.  For  instance,  Iyer  and
Davenport (2008) illustrate Google’s ecosystem wherein Google plays the role of a key-
stone controlling the evolution of its ecosystem. In that ecosystem, Google is the hub of
all germinal revenue streams—i.e., all the transactions are performed through the
Google platform—enabling the firm to have complete awareness of by-product infor-
mation  and  access  to  it.  Just  like  Google,  Apple,  Ford,  IBM,  and  Wal-Mart  have  all
stood—or still  stand—on podium of the leader as well  (J.  F.  Moore,  1993).  Similarly,
Iansiti and Levien (2004a) illustrate the Wal-Mart’s ecosystem as well and Cusumano
and Gawer (2002) talk about Microsoft, for instance. Moreover, a firm cannot decide to
become a keystone or ecosystem leader solely by itself, but the rest of the community
(e.g., complementors and suppliers) apprentice the leadership over time (J. F. Moore,
1993).
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Roles,  such as keystone and complementor,  are not static in the ecosystems (Iansiti  &
Levien, 2004a), albeit keystones, though, encourage all the other ecosystem actors to
invest in cooperation and toward a common, more lucrative future (J. F. Moore, 1993).
Shifting roles in an ecosystem, in process of time, may alter the ‘hierarchy’ (J. F.
Moore, 1993) or a firm may be a keystone in one domain and, for instance, comple-
mentor in another (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a). Microsoft is one example of a firm which
is simultaneously a platform leader and a complementor for the PC. Primarily, Mi-
crosoft is the platform leader due to the influence it creates over PC system architecture
and other, complementary products manufacturing companies; however, at the same
time, Microsoft is a complementor making ancillary software that the PC makers can
utilize in their offerings (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002).
In any given ecosystem structure or ‘hierarchy’, the competitive advantage of the firm is
reliant on the firm’s ability to create value greater than its rivals’ (Brandenburger &
Stuart, 1996; Porter, 1985). In value aspect, an effective keystone strategy has two parts:
the creation of value within the ecosystem and the sharing of value within others partic-
ipants in the ecosystem (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a). Iansiti and Levien (2004a) argue that,
in the first place, to create value for their ecosystem a keystone has to establish a plat-
form, a physical or intellectual asset that affords viable solutions to other ecosystem
members. For instance, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing provides semiconductor
manufacturing for the firms that do not have their own substrate (e.g., silicon-wafer)
production, and Microsoft offers the Windows OS (operating system) platform. The In-
ternet  giant  eBay  is  mutually  a  good  example  of  a  keystone  company  that  shares  the
value it creates with other members in the ecosystem, and by doing so, eBay is continu-
ously expanding its business and ecosystem (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a).
As the roles in an ecosystem are not static, wannabes (firms that want to be keystones)
are frequently challenging the keystone firms and trying to dethrone the platform leader
from its position (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002). An ecosystem member trying to edge
other players out can also be referred to as the dominator. In nature, dominators such as
weeds try to supplant other species in their ecosystem. Similarly, in the business world,
dominators try to dethrone keystones and niche players in their business ecosystem.
Foregoing niche players represent the majority of companies in the business world, like
the majority of species in nature, with an important contribution to the prosperity and
existence of their ecosystem. (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a.) Taking the role of niche players
into consideration, they can be referred to as complementors, as well. For example, in
the PC industry, there are numerous niche players manufacturing hardware and produc-
ing software for the platform leaders that eventually take the advantage of niche play-
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ers’ innovations. That is, niche players function as complementors for platform leaders
or focal firms12.
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) argue that the clustering of focal firms, complementors,
and niche players is no accident,  but rather a strategy to exploit complementarities.
The role of bargaining power, co-specialization, and relationship between business net-
work partners in shaping companies’ value capture have been explored in the strategy
literature; notwithstanding these studies, the question of fundamental creation of value
has hitherto tended to be disregarded (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). The question is im-
portant as the market does not operate properly if the imitation of innovations is easy
and innovating firms do not accrue profits intended for them (Teece, 1986).  Additional-
ly, the presence of different roles and actors in the value chain has been distinguished,
albeit the specific value chain position of an exchange party (e.g., a supplier, comple-
mentor, or buyer) relative to the focal firm has seen negligible (Adner & Kapoor, 2010).
However, the need for “the innovating firm to establish a prior position in these com-
plementary assets” has been noticed a long time ago (Teece, 1986, p. 285).
Adner and Kapoor seize upon the foregoing ‘flaw’, and they propose a perspective that
“exploits the relative location of activities within the ecosystem to distinguish among
the different roles played by various actors in the firm’s environment” (2010, p. 309). In
their framework, the flow of inputs and outputs determines the locations of activities in
12 NVIDIA is one example of a niche player in the computing ecosystem, in which it  designs computer
graphic cards, provides customer support, and deals with marketing (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a). The good
examples of platform leaders are Intel and Microsoft, discussed by Cusumano and Gawer (2002).
Figure 3-3: Generic schema of an innovation ecosystem. Adapted from Adner and Ka-
poor (2010, p. 309).
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the ecosystem; see Figure 3-3 for a depiction. The focal firm receives inputs from the
upstream suppliers whereas their outputs serve as components to the focal actor. The
focal firm assembles the components into its product and delivers it forward as an out-
put. As for the focal firm’s product, it serves as an input to a customer who might also
need complementors’ inputs to be bundled alongside the focal firm’s product to utilize
the offering in the meaningful way. The central idea in the model is the location of ele-
ments relative to the focal firm; furthermore, it does not make any difference whether
components or complements are produced in the same firm or not (Adner & Kapoor,
2010).
The central idea can be understood in the light of an illustrating example. Samsung is a
manufacturer of TVs, tablets, smartphones, cameras, laptops, Blu-ray players, etc. that
all are separate offers even though the value offering firm is common. For instance,
Samsung TVs can  be  seen  as  the  focal  offer  to  end  customers  and  Blu-ray  players  as
complements. The focal offer and the complement are brought together by the customer
regardless of whether the Blu-ray player is offered by Samsung or Sony. The study can
be extended backward and forward along the activity chain, of course, but it is not
meaningful or necessary in this thesis. In the next section, there is another example ex-
amined in more detail from a semiconductor lithography industry.
3.1.4 Empirical context: semiconductor lithography
Semiconductor lithography (also called photolithography) is used in manufacturing of
integrated circuits (IC).  Put simply, in the lithography process, a three-dimensional cir-
cuit design is imprinted on a semiconductor (e.g., silicon) substrate. Adner and Kapoor
(2007, 2010), as well as Kapoor and Adner (2007), illustrate the semiconductor lithog-
raphy ecosystem and how the ecosystem as a whole, rather than individual elements,
determines how fast and how far the semiconductor manufacturing advances. Figure 3-4
provides a straightforward scheme of the semiconductor lithography ecosystem com-
prising the component suppliers (lens producers and energy source producers), focal
firm (lithography tool producers), complementary products manufacturers (mask pro-
ducers and resist producers), and customer (semiconductor manufacturers). The semi-
conductor lithography ecosystem has not changed since the birth of the industry and
will probably not change in the near future either, unless “an existing element of the
ecosystem reaches a breaking point” or “an alternative approach…could emerge”
(Adner & Kapoor, 2007, p. S20). Despite the stability of the ecosystem structure, there
have been a vast amount of varying challenges across the technology transitions
(Kapoor & Adner, 2007).
By following Kapoor and Adner (2007), in the semiconductor lithography ecosystem
(see Figure 3-4), the lithography tool producers serve as the focal firms, subsequently
offering the lithography tools to their customers (i.e., semiconductor manufacturers). As
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for lens producers and energy source producers, they function as the key components
suppliers that lithography tool makers need in their offers. Ultimately, in addition to li-
thography tools, the semiconductor manufacturers are reliant on the two key comple-
mentors—mask producers and resist producers—to completely fulfill their value propo-
sition (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). Furthermore, in the semiconductor lithography ecosys-
tem, the focal firm can be comprehended as a module producer for the semiconductor
manufacturer utilizing the two complementors in its offering, as well. Reciprocally, the
lithography tool producer can also be seen as a platform for the components suppliers in
the upstream.
In the semiconductor manufacturing industry, the progress of lithography has been a
major  engine  striving  for  the  advance  of  the  industry  as  a  whole  (Kapoor  &  Adner,
2007).  In the same way as semiconductor manufacturing is reliant on the development
of the lithography tools it is also reliant on its complements, and further, the lithography
tool producers cannot advance their offerings without the development of components.
That is, an innovation capacity of a focal firm is not solely sufficient but both down-
stream complementors and upstream component suppliers have to evolve along and be
capable of serving an adequate level of functionality and efficiency within the desired
timeframe to make the final offering development possible. Contribution of every actor
is de rigueur for the ecosystem to evolve—and the customer experience to enhance,
too—in Moore’s (1993, p. 76) words, actors “coevolve capabilities around a new inno-
vation”. In the sequential section, a new, seminal insight into ecosystems is discussed
and subsequently used in the empirical phase.
Figure 3-4: A schema of the semiconductor lithography ecosystem. Adapted from Ka-
poor and Adner (2007, p. 52).
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3.2 Value blueprint
3.2.1 A view on ecosystem
According to Iansiti and Levien (2004a), an effective keystone strategy includes two
parts: value creation and sharing. Also a firm’s competitive advantage is dependent on
its ability to create greater value than its competitors (Brandenburger & Stuart, 1996;
Porter, 1985). Adner’s (2012) value blueprint offers a mapping tool how to render a
firm’s value proposition into action. Furthermore, Adner notes
Drawing a value blueprint is an exercise in discipline that forces you to construct the
entire picture around your project at the beginning. It shows you where you have a
coherent strategy, where you have inconsistencies, and where you are just hand
waving. (2012, p. 100)
Assessing alternative configurations and to generate shared understanding and agree-
ment among the partners, a firm will need a tool to converge multiple elements together.
Related to the value and supply chains, the value blueprint is a unique tool that differs
from the latter in that it is explicit about the specific location and links of complement-
ors that are critical for firm’s or innovation’s success (Adner, 2012). Essentially, the
value blueprint builds on the fundamental works and perspectives of authors such as
Michael Porter (1985), Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996), Clayton Christensen
(1997), and Charles Fine (1998), with a distinction of a focus on delivering the value
proposition in the most effective way (Adner, 2012, p. 245).
The value blueprint explicitly maps a firm’s ecosystem and its dependencies on suppli-
ers and complementors, as depicted in Figure 3-5. The elements that are required to de-
liver the value proposition are laid out on the value blueprint map. Adner (2012) states
that the map shows how intermediaries are linked to complementors and complementors
to suppliers, how a firm is positioned in the ecosystem, and which actors are responsible
for what (see Table 3-1). Each participant has to be in place in order to ecosystem come
together as a whole. Furthermore, this kind of collaboration is most likely to entail co-
operation-related risks.
By following Adner (2012, pp. 33–35), the risks of innovation can be assessed through
three risk categories: execution risk, co-innovation risk, and adoption chain risk. In Bri-
an Leavy’s (2012) interview with Ron Adner, Adner explains that it is the execution
risk that has been historically taken great care of—it has been important to develop in-
novations valued by customers and deliver them better than competitors. Nowadays, a
plain risk assessment is not enough; the ecosystem has to be taken into account. For in-
stance, focusing only on the execution leads firms to neglect their dependencies on other
actors that increase co-innovation and adoption chain risk.
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The discovery of a new innovation involves execution risk; the innovation should be
valued by customers. The innovation has to entail at least required specification, and it
has to be launched within the required time (Adner, 2012, p. 33). As for co-innovation
risk, it takes other actors’ innovations—that are requisite for the value proposition to
take off—into consideration as well, meaning that the innovation will not thrive without
key complements. Furthermore, Adner (see Leavy, 2012) argue that complementor co-
innovation risk measures the probability of failure associated with other actors. In other
words, the probability depends on how likely all other actors will be able to succeed
within a required time. For instance, if a firm’s collaborators will be able to deliver the
offering on the 0.9 probability, then the probability that five collaborators will deliver
on time is not fivefold but 0.95 § 0.59, or approximately 59 percent. Hence, the key
principle is that the co-innovation risk is not about average, but multiplication.
In addition to execution and co-innovation risk, adoption chain risk is the third risk cat-
egory Adner describes. In Leavy’s (2012) interview, Adner explains that adoption chain
risk is about intermediaries; one or more intermediaries have to adopt the innovation
before it has a chance to reach end consumers with full potential. That is, if one of the
intermediaries does not benefit from the new innovation, the intermediary will not make
the necessary adaptations to its own activities and the innovation will never reach the
end consumers. Assessing adoption chain risk, a firm must ensure that the adoption of
the new innovation will benefit every intermediary in the ecosystem.
Clearly,  it  is  crucial  to  firms  to  critically  assess  both  co-innovation  risk  and  adoption
Table 3-1: Definitions for various actors that are fundamental in the creation of a value
blueprint. Adapted from Adner and Kapoor (2010), Adner (2012), and Cusumano and
Gawer (2002).
Actor Definition and role
Supplier Suppliers are actors who provide crucial input to focal firm. Focal firm needs suppli-
er(s) in order to offer a complete product to end customer.
Focal firm Focal firm is the most central company in the ecosystem.
Intermediary Intermediary is actor that must adopt focal firm’s innovation before it reaches end
customer.
Complementor Complementor is an essential actor in the environment, outside of focal firm’s direct
supply chain. End customer cannot utilize focal firm’s offer to its full potential with-
out key complementor(s).
End customer End customer is the final target of the value proposition of focal firm. End custom-
er’s need to adopt the product for focal firm to claim success.
Wannabe A company that endeavors to be platform leader (i.e., focal firm).
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chain risk. The critical assessment of the risks would help innovator firms identify and
more precisely structure their partners, since the success of these partners is necessary
for the innovator firms’ success. Mapping the value blueprint through risk analysis
helps firms to decide, clarify, and understand what the structure of the collaboration
would possibly look like—where the partners are specifically located in the activity
chain and what are their roles in delivering the overall value (Leavy, 2012). Ultimately,
the value blueprint shows how activities are bundled together and what is the role of
each element in the ecosystem; see visual depiction in Figure 3-5.
In order to get the participants in right places, Adner (2012, pp. 85–87) provides an
eight-step guide to construct a value blueprint:
1. Identify end customer.
2. Identify your own offering.
3. Identify your suppliers.
4. Identify intermediaries.
5. Identify complementors.
6. Identify the risks in the ecosystem.
7. Identify a viable solution for every partner unable or unwilling to cooperate.
8. Update the blueprint on regular basis.
The straightforward steps to construct the value blueprint are quite simple to follow. At
first (steps 1 to 5), all the actors have to be identified. Working backwards from the
recognition of the end consumer, a firm has to recognize its position in the ecosystem as
well as its suppliers and direct intermediaries. More difficult but necessary is to identify
the actors who the firm has no immediate contact with, yet they are involved in creating
Figure 3-5: A schematic value blueprint map illustrating the actors and their roles in
the ecosystem. Adapted from Adner (2012, p. 87).
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the value proposition. After every participant is identified, the second part (step 6) en-
tails assessing the participants’ co-innovation and adoption chain risks. (Adner, 2012,
pp. 84–87.) Furthermore, mapping the value blueprint gives a firm “a tangible form to
the value proposition” and helps in refining its strategy (Leavy, 2012, p. 17). The fore-
going guide to construct a value blueprint is simplified from detailed guide provided in
Appendix 2.
Adner (2012, pp. 86–88) argues that not the ownership but the elements themselves are
what matters. Either the elements come from the same firm or not, they have to be as-
sessed separately when identifying the relationships among the elements and how to
identify and address the risks that are inherent in collaborative ecosystems. Nonetheless,
it is not necessary that a new innovation sees no obstacle in its path, but a firm must
have a plan how to overcome the obstacles it sees. There can be several different scenar-
ios and often it is as an iterative process to find the most promising path. However,
making the necessary adjustments beforehand is what sorts the wheat from the chaff.
That is, ignoring the steps six and seven may lead into a catastrophic end result.
In order to make the adjustments, Adner (2012) provides five levers of ecosystem re-
configuration. The ecosystem reconfiguration entails finding a new way to piece togeth-
er the elements of the jigsaw. Adner (2012, pp. 177–178) argues that the five means of
reforming an ecosystem are relocate, separate, combine, add, and subtract, as depicted
in Figure 3-6. Taking an imaginary ecosystem to enlarge on, ‘relocate’ means shifting
existing elements in the ecosystem to new, more productive locations, if possible. An-
other technique is to decouple bundled elements, meaning whether there is a way to
separate some activities to eliminate a bottleneck. Obviously, ‘combine’ denotes the ex-
act opposite of the latter; that is, to seek for an opportunity to bundle elements that are
uncoupled such that it creates new value. Similarly, ‘add’ and ‘subtract’ are the other
opposing levers, meaning including absent elements in the ecosystem to facilitate the
productivity or eliminating existing elements in order to enhance the overall viability of
the ecosystem, respectively.
Furthermore, while configuring or reconfiguring a business ecosystem, one can take ad-
vantage of a number of effective practices that could help in developing a vision and
strategy for a platform or innovation. For example, Gawer and Cusumano (2013) list
effective practices for platform leadership, including development of a vision of a prod-
uct’s essentialness, identification of complementors, building an easy-to-connect archi-
tecture for complementor, co-creation via mutually enhancing business models, risk
sharing, incremental improvement on the core, etc. However, they note that the mecha-
nisms behind the emergence of industry platforms are yet unclear and an important area
of further research. As a result, Gawer and Cusumano conclude “the difficulty to follow
the emergence of platforms may be compounded by the inherent methodological diffi-
culty involved when attempting to follow the emergence of an unknown entity, when
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one cannot know ex ante who the actors involved in the emergence process will be”
(2013, p. 13).
Indeed, it seems to be extremely troublesome to identify the crucial actors and their lo-
cations in an ecosystem. Especially, when a firm cannot know in advance who the ac-
tors involved in the emergence process will be (Gawer & Cusumano, 2013). On the oth-
er hand, although a firm manages to identify the actors, placing them right is not an eas-
ier task. For instance, Sony ‘felt the pinch’ as its portable electronic book reader re-
vealed to be unsuccessful, as seen in the forthcoming section.
3.2.2 Empirical context: Sony versus Amazon
Both Sony and Amazon launched—quite similar—electronic book readers in 2006 and
2007, respectively. Both knew that there was a market for e-book readers sporting high-
quality and entertaining features (Leavy, 2012). Similarities notwithstanding, Sony’s
PRS-500 Portable Reader misfired, but Amazon’s Kindle succeeded. Adner (2012, pp.
88–99) argue that Sony’s failure in developing the market for e-book readers was nei-
ther due to an inferior device nor lack of customers but not seeing a blind spot that
adoption chain created. Amazon’s drastically divergent approach to content and design
differentiated it from Sony. The differing approaches considering value creation led
Sony and Amazon to the different approaches considering the value delivery and, fur-
ther, radically differing value blueprints (see Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8). Ergo, what did
the two giants make differently? In the figures, the status of an element is symbolized
Figure 3-6: Five means of ecosystem reconfiguration to attain a bottleneck-free value
blueprint. Adapted from Adner (2012, p. 178).
Bottleneck-free value blueprint
Add/
Subtract
Separate/
Combine
Recolate
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by using a green-yellow-red traffic light continuum, reflecting whether the correspond-
ing element is either all set (i.e., green), nearly but not just quite ready (i.e., yellow), or
not even close of being ready (i.e., red)13.
As depicted in the Figure 3-7, at launch time, the Reader underwent a clear, all-lights-
green path across the line of the project (Sony Reader), suppliers (E Ink screen, other
components, and Sony DRM), and intermediaries (retailers). Nevertheless, targeting the
mainstream book readers, Sony’s endeavors to manufacture a great device were not
enough as the target customers needed also something to read. That is, the Reader re-
quired a complementary service delivering e-books in its ecosystem. Complementors,
such as Sony’s own online retail outlet Connect.com, were needed to complete and de-
liver the actual value proposition. However, even if the Connect.com had worked and
succeeded in enticing people to use it, the blind spot lay in a critical adoption chain
partner—the reserved publishers. (Adner, 2012, pp. 88–99.) Sony presumed that pub-
lishers would be enticed to participate by a superior design and eventually come along
(Leavy, 2012). In truth, Sony designed its entire proposition not focusing on the pub-
lishers from which reason the publishers found themselves in a very uncomfortable po-
sition (Gusen, 2012).
On the contrary, Amazon entered the fray with the publishers very clearly in mind
(Gusen, 2012). Amazon’s Kindle was larger and heavier than Sony’s Reader, and it had
an inferior screen (Adner, 2012, p. 96). In addition, the Kindle was designed as a closed
13 “For co-innovation risk, green means that they are ready to and in place; yellow means that they are not
yet in place, but that there is a plan…and red means that they are not in place and there is no clear plan.
For adoption risk, green means your partners are eager to participate…yellow means that they are neutral
but open to inducement; and red means they have clear reasons to prefer status quo and prefer not to par-
ticipate in the proposition as it stands.” (Adner, 2012, p. 86)
Figure 3-7: The value blueprint of Sony’s e-reader at launch in 2006. Adapted from
Adner (2012, p. 94).
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platform that did not let users to share or print books (Leavy, 2012).  All the limitations
were carefully considered and put in. Amazon made the Kindle inferior to the Reader on
purpose and engineered a solution instead of a mere device. From the vantage point of
the end customer, the Kindle offered a simple and inexpensive way to enjoy an expan-
sive collection of titles—on Amazon.com—without the need of the PC or other devices
to download books. (Adner, 2012, pp. 95–97.) As a stand-alone device, the limitations it
had also offset the publishers concerns about DRM (digital rights management) and pi-
racy issues, doing the device justice and making it more attractive to publishers (Gusen,
2012; Leavy, 2012). Amazon made the necessary adjustments beforehand and ensured
that publishers were involved in and not showing the red light at launch (Leavy, 2012).
Obviously, Amazon won the bout by offering a solution instead of a mere device. Jeff
Bezos, the then CEO of Amazon, described this revolutionary idea by saying that the
Kindle “isn’t a device, it’s a service” (see Levy, 2007, p. 58). Amazon succeeded by
recognizing an adoption chain risk and realized that the challenge as an innovator was
not finding the win-win situation (i.e., both Amazon and end customer would win), but
finding a solution in which all win, including Amazon, end customer, and adoption
chain partner, namely publisher (Gusen, 2012). In spite of the compelling vision of
Sony’s product, Amazon simplified the value proposition for all the other actors in-
volved, as seen in its value blueprint in the Figure 3-8. Adner argue that (2012, pp. 95–
98)  Amazon also  had  a  clear  vision  how to  turn  the  two yellow lights  to  green  while
Sony was without a clear plan how to turn red to green.
Worth mentioning is the fact that Amazon was responsible for approximately thirty per-
cent of books sold in the United States; obviously, publishers had to regard with greater
attention to Amazon’s Kindle (Adner, 2012, pp. 95–98). After all, even one red light is
enough to condemn offering to a doom because, in Adner’s words, “if it’s [value propo-
sition] ‘win, lose, win’, you lose” (see Gusen, 2012, p. 89). For this reason, the
Figure 3-8: The value blueprint of Amazon’s Kindle at launch in 2007. Adapted from
Adner (2012, p. 96).
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subsequent discussion on DR business ecosystems aims at identifying the loose links,
impeding the adoption of DR. Furthermore,  later discussion endeavors to find a ‘solu-
tion’ instead of a mere application (referring to DR).
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4 RESEARCH METHOD AND MATERIAL
4.1 Method and strategy
As it is mentioned in the introductory chapter hereinbefore, this study was conducted
using qualitative technique to collect data. Qualitative research methods, as van Maanen
attests, can be described “as an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe,
decode, translate, and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of
certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena” (1983, p. 9). In this study, qualita-
tive research methodology was employed such that multiple DR ecosystem cases (see
Appendix 3) were examined through the implementation of focus group discussions.
Qualitative technique can be utilized regardless of research philosophy, thus little limit-
ing the approach taken. That being said, in terms of research philosophy, a perspective
of  realism  entails  a  perception  of  reality  and  absolute  truth  (Saunders  et  al.,  2009,  p.
129). The distinctive feature of realism is a trust that an unobservable reality exists, of
which theories of science can give us knowledge (Godfrey & Hill, 1995). Positivism, in
turn, presumes the end products of studies to be generalizations, comparable to those in
the natural sciences (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 129). The descriptive nature of this study
implicates that neither the truth yet exists nor will the end result be generalizable as
such, meaning that the approach of this research cannot be from either a realist or posi-
tivist perspective. Furthermore, since an ‘empathetic stance’—that I have not adopted—
is a crucial element to the interpretivism philosophy (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 116), the
interpretivist perspective could not be considered as approach. As a result, I have con-
ducted an approach of pragmatism that Saunders et al. state having a “focus on practical
applied research, integrating different perspectives to help interpret the data” (2009, p.
119).
Owing to the exploratory nature of this research (Robson, 2002, p. 59), it is not clear
whether to exploit a deductive or inductive research approach. Hence, as discussed ear-
lier in the introductory chapter, this research utilizes a combination of deduction and
induction, employing some aspects from both. In short, as Saunders et al. (2009, p. 129)
attest, the inductive approach is based on collected data from which a theory is devel-
oped, whereas the deductive one operates vice versa (i.e., tests a theory). Here, the eco-
system framework stems from literature and further, the existing literature is employed to
formulate the research question and objectives. On the other hand, this study presumes a
close understanding of the research context, which, in turn, seems to has few, or lack, prop-
er real-life cases in liberalized markets (e.g., Finland and other Nordic countries), from
which to gather the empirical data.
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As the research has both deductive and inductive aspects as well as the exploratory and
descriptive purpose, it was appropriate to choose a multi-method qualitative study as a
research strategy (Saunders et al., 2009). That is, by using this strategy multiple qualita-
tive data sources were possible to conjoin to strengthen the validity of the study. Fur-
thermore, this research is cross-sectional concerning time horizon since the available
time constrains the use of longitudinal study. However, longitudinal research on DR
ecosystems would be interesting indeed, since the electricity markets and corresponding
market-wise business models are likely about to change when new smart grid technolo-
gies emerge.
Taking the preceding discussion together, this study endeavors to increase the grasp of
DR business opportunities and threats through novel insight into this field, accompanied
by workshops, focus group discussions, and secondary sources. The emphasis here was
put more on the ecosystem framework and how this particular framework mirrors the
opportunities and threats surrounding the potentially emerging DR services in the Nor-
dic countries and Finland. I  do not take a stand on whether the framework is the most
feasible one in this field or not, although van Aken attests “all good theories are practi-
cal, but some are more practical than others” (2004, p. 220). The chosen framework is
to interpret and read issues from a different aspect. Moreover, as Adner states, a frame-
work generally “presents elements and relationships that provide a grammar for the de-
bate” (2006, p. 106). In actuality, the purpose of this study is to provide DR ecosystems
that present elements and relationships that provide a basis for the further discussion.
4.2 Material
The material used to accomplish this research comprises literature review and work-
shops under SGEM organization. The literature provides a theoretical foundation for the
electricity markets as a whole and DR in particular as well as the business ecosystem
framework contributing this study. The electricity market having its own unique ele-
ments is discussed in the separate chapter from business ecosystem scheme, thus giving
a practical structure for the study. Three DR workshops and several discussion sessions
had a significant contribution to the research. Moreover, the last workshop provided the
main input into the study, since it was organized around the DR ecosystem theme.
As mentioned, the literature is the twofold one of the electricity market and business
ecosystem. The chapter of the electricity market is to clarify the industry and corre-
sponding industry-specific functions. The chapter at hand also presents the idea of DR,
including the assessment of its value. The literature on and knowledge of the Nordic
electricity markets are somewhat unambiguous as such, albeit one can argue that the
markets and certain functions could be rendered better. Nevertheless, the electricity
market is not a framework, but an operational environment that defines certain bounda-
ry conditions (e.g., the unbundling of DSO and supplier). Customer value, in turn, is
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more nebulous and subject to interpretation since it depends on various variables. Con-
sequently, the literature on DR was scrutinized widely with the intention of acquire as
broad knowledge of DR as possible in order to develop possible value propositions. The
literature, too, served as a secondary source of questionnaires, interviews, and case stud-
ies, affording more depth to the research at hand.
Another half of the literature review presents the business ecosystem framework. To
begin with, the objective of this study is not to validate the comprehensiveness of the
framework, as discussed hereinbefore. Rather, the rationale is to provide new insights
into the field and increase consciousness of business perspective in the selected setting.
As presented in Figure 3-1 (p. 39), the interest in business ecosystems has increased
greatly during the past five years, reason of which leading academic journals have is-
sued a number of valid articles to offer a foundation on which to build. However, in his
seminal publication, The Wide Lens: A New Strategy for Innovation, Ron Adner (2012)
presents the value blueprint concept, which act as a backbone for the whole research.
As the title of the Adner’s book implies, the value blueprint mandates the consideration
of the business ecosystem through a wide lens. The wide-lens examination of DR eco-
systems necessitates extensive knowledge of and view on the electricity market. Hence,
several experts on various disciplines were obtained to proffer advice and information
(see Table 4-1). The contributors listed in the table below provided a significant input
on the study as a whole; further, eleven out of sixteen (prefixed by a star) participated in
the last DR workshop, thus affording roughly superior contribution to other participants.
As seen in the table, the affiliations vary favorably, improving the validity of the work-
shops overall discussion and as if smoothing the likelihood of affiliation bias.
The workshop events comprised three separate occasions, each of which was convened
via an e-mail invitation sent to people contributing to DR-related SGEM work package.
The e-mail  invitations contained topics for the corresponding workshop as well  as the
timetable for the day. The five-and-a-half hour workshops were timetabled to com-
mence at 10 p.m. and dealt with two to four topics each. From each workshop, the par-
ticipants’ names were collected and the outcomes documented as well as shared to be
available in the SGEM portal for later inspection and use.
As for the events, the first event incorporated topics about load and response modeling
as well as price settlement by HEMS, the event took place on June 4th. The event con-
centrated mainly on technology perspectives concerning DR and its applications, yet
providing essential background information on business vantage point as well. Like-
wise, the second workshop, held on September 19th, focused largely on technical aspects
of  DR and  DSM; however,  the  event  entailed  a  salient  view on  DR pilot  programs—
both the past and forthcoming. Concerning this study, the most quintessential
knowledge was provided in the third workshop on October 28th. The workshop included
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an in-depth focus group discussion concentrating on DR business aspects, specifically
business ecosystems.
I adopted a focus group discussion method as the means of collecting primary data and
to carry out the workshops due to its suitable characteristics for this research. Focus
group is defined by Powell et al. as “a group of individuals selected and assembled by
researchers to discuss and comment on, from personal experience,  the topic that is  the
subject of the research” (1996, p. 499) and, according to Morgan, the topic is also “sup-
plied by the researcher” (1997, p. 12). Moreover, the purpose of a focus group discus-
sion is to gather information by listening (Krueger & Casey, 2000, p. 4). The focus
group discussions differ from many other data collecting techniques in that it may be
conducted in a non-directive and unstructured manner to aid in the development of the
researcher’s understanding and analysis of an issue at hand (Gilmore & Carson, 1996).
Hence, relaxed and comfortable discussions lighten the atmosphere of the focus group
Table 4-1: List of people contributing the empirical stage of the research. Star (*) sym-
bolizes a person that involved in the focus group discussion (i.e., the third workshop
event).
 Contributor Education Affiliation Title
* Alfa Ph.D. Research Associate professor
* Bravo Ph.D. Research Professor
* Charlie M.B.A. & Ph.D. student
(Tech.)
Utility (U.S.A.) / Re-
search
Smart grid executive
* Delta Ph.D. student (Tech.) Research Research assistant
* Echo M.Sc. (Tech.) EM service provider Application specialist
* Foxtrot M.Sc. (Tech.) Technology Project engineer
* Golf M.Sc. (Tech.) Research Research scientist
* Hotel - Technology -
* India M.Sc. (Tech.) DSO Development engineer
* Juliett E.M.B.A. EM service provider Development director
* Kilo M.Sc. (Tech.) Supplier Development engineer
Lima Ph.D. Technology Managing director
Mike Ph.D. Research Senior research scientist
November M.Sc. (Tech.) TSO Manager, R&D
Oscar M.Sc. (Tech.) Construction Project engineer
Papa M.Sc. Technology Chief technology officer
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discussions which may often be enjoyable for participants (Casey & Krueger, 1994),
thus leading probably to comprehensive and frank conversation. Finally, the discussions
are carefully and systematically analyzed afterwards, providing insights into the issue
and how it is perceived by various individuals (Krueger & Casey, 2000, p. 4).
Furthermore, as Krueger and Casey clearly suggest, the focus group discussions typical-
ly have five characteristics that “relate to the ingredients of a focus group: (1) people
who (2) possess certain characteristics and (3) provide qualitative data (4) in a focused
discussion (5) to help understand the topic of interest” (2000, p. 10). Put differently, the
focus group discussions entail the features of focused questions, no push for agreement
or consensus, permissive and non-threatening environment, homogeneous participants,
reasonable group size (4–12 persons), several groups, moderator guided group, and sys-
tematic and verifiable analysis (Krueger & Casey, 2010).
In this study, the focus group discussion, or workshop, on business ecosystem was built
on two fundamental objectives: the recognition of bottlenecks potentially impeding the
adoption of DR and the consideration of reconfiguring the roles of various actors oper-
ating in the market. The event was organized around ‘free speech’ environment, mean-
ing that the occasion was little governed. At the beginning, the participants were
grouped equally into two teams instructed by the event moderators (i.e., I and my col-
league). That being said, the moderators, or ‘facilitators’ (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 347),
allowed the other participants to do the creative work, thus avoiding misdirecting the
discussion according to their own, as if restricted thoughts. Furthermore, the desired
outcomes of the workshop were to compile a list of reasons for the bottlenecks as well
as a list of proposed actions how to manage the bottlenecks.
In addition to the workshop events, the study also incorporated an unconference event in
Espoo on October 25th and 26th, 2013. My contribution to the unconference was a de-
mand response ecosystem poster drafted in cooperation with Alfa, Bravo, and Delta (see
Appendix 4). A total of 36 posters were presented at the unconference on a poster mar-
ket. The idea of the poster market was to gather feedback and insights from peers that
could improve the research in SGEM. I was responsible for presenting our DR ecosys-
tem poster, thus the unconference event provided some insights into this study, as well.
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5 DEMAND RESPONSE ECOSYSTEMS
5.1 Swimlane blueprint
Ginsberg et al. (2010) see the ecosystem approach important when the smart grid is
considered. They argue
Our first observation, distinguishing the forest from the trees, is perhaps obvious
but worth stating upfront. At least for smart grids, employing an innovation eco-
system strategy appears quite important. (2010, p. 2792)
However, the ecosystem concept in general and value blueprint in particular proved dif-
ficult to grasp during many discussions. Building upon the value blueprint concept, I
developed the swimlane blueprint, an ecosystem depiction to facilitate the actual prob-
lem solving and steer the discussion in the right direction (see Figure 5-1). Swimlanes
are visual illustrations used more often in business process modeling, visualizing pro-
cesses and decisions grouped in lanes. The swimlane ecosystem utilizes the lanes in
highlighting the central elements in the ecosystem and more explicitly presenting which
elements act as complementors and intermediaries. The purpose of this presentation
style is to ease the conversation around the business angle of complex systems and di-
rect the focus on intended elements and issues.
In the swimlane blueprint, complementing actors and elements are grouped in lanes, as
depicted in Figure 5-1. The roles of complementors, consumer, focal firm, intermediar-
ies, and suppliers are as Adner and Kapoor (2010) as well as Adner (2012) define them
(see Table 3-1 as a reminder, p. 49). The distinction draws from the lanes that explicitly
show the complementary mechanisms and value since they are captioned. Both the
lanes’ captioning and the segregation of the developers of complementary products or
services help one interpret the relationships between the actors. Unlike in swimming
contest, the position of a lane in the swimlane blueprint does not make an argument for
or against the success of that lane (in swimming contest, the top performers and winning
candidates are likely to be positioned in the middle lanes). In the swimlane blueprint,
focal firm and its direct value delivery is positioned in the middle, and complementary
offers around the focal lane.
Relationships between elements are illustrated with solid arrows. The arrow from one
element to another indicates the value delivery since the swimlane blueprint depicts val-
ue creation in an ecosystem. Considering money, it typically flows in the direction op-
posite to the value since value delivery means selling something to someone against
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money. For example, car manufacturer sells cars to retailer who resells them to consum-
ers. On the other hand, value delivery can also mean enabling something to someone.
For instance, a 3G telecommunication network support services that provide high-speed
information transfer, enabling consumers to benefit from their smartphones and tablet
computers.  Consumers  do  not  clearly  buy  3G  network  but  subscribe  to  a
telecommunication service featuring 3G connectivity. As a result, they get access to a
platform that is crucial for modern smartphone and tablet applications and services.
Moreover, the point is that an arrow shows the value delivery but it does not necessarily
reflect the route of money.
Complex business ecosystems seem to be easier to grasp when it is explicitly presented
what the actual roles of various elements are in the ecosystem. The aforementioned be-
came clear in the early stages of the research and signaled that an even more explicit
depiction (compared to the value blueprint) was required to ease people to contribute to
this study. The swimlane blueprint concept fulfilled its purpose quite nicely, albeit the
representations used in the workshops (see Appendix 3) varies slightly from the further
developed version presented here. From now on, the visual depictions of DR ecosys-
tems rest on the swimlane blueprint with an intention to be as unambiguous as possible.
Figure 5-1: A schematic swimlane blueprint illustrating more explicitly the roles of el-
ements in the ecosystem than ‘traditional’ value blueprint map.
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5.2 Laying the foundation for demand response eco-
systems
So far, the DR ecosystem has been perceived as an ecosystem problem, in which multi-
ple elements need to come together to enable the value proposition. A unique feature of
the liberalized electricity market in the Nordic countries is a twofold nature of electrici-
ty. It is not an integrated product anymore, but the commodity and the service must be
treated as segregated offers (Roggenkamp & Boisseleau, 2005). That is, the commodity
electricity is bought and sold in the common market as products, whereas the service
equals mainly transportation. As already mentioned, the transportation (i.e., transmis-
sion  or  distribution)  operates  under  certain  regulatory  rules  while  the  commodity  ex-
change is not tied to the same rules and it is as if deregulated in this manner. However,
both actors and their cooperation are needed, causing this particular market being ex-
traordinary challenging.
Therefore, in order to understand the nature and process of ecosystem development, one
has to fathom how the ecosystem is depicted in its current state. In addition to above-
mentioned twofold nature of electricity, various market places and their different eco-
nomic logic add more complexity to this field. According to the limitations, this thesis
focuses only on physical contracts and exchange; financial contracts such as hedging
and futures are not considered either. Moreover, I have adopted mainly the Adner’s val-
ue blueprint concept to assess the DR ecosystem. Nonetheless, there are other tools, too,
to analyze business ecosystems providing slightly differing approach (e.g., Battistella,
Colucci, De Toni, & Nonino, 2013).
Elspot, Elbas, and the balancing market form the ecosystem having each, however, their
own characteristics in a way how the respective market functions. In the ecosystem
point  of  view,  Elspot  and  Elbas  markets  work  quite  the  same  way14, and they are re-
ferred to as power exchange in Figure 5-2.  In the figure,  the line from the DSO to the
consumer (i.e., DSO referred to as complementor) is drawn due to the fact that the con-
sumer may not enter into an agreement with the supplier without a connection to the
physical electric supply. Moreover, the DSO provides also the meters to the consumers’
premises, but it must be noted that both the connection and meters are ‘services’ that the
consumer cannot choose but they are there as if of necessity implemented.
In addition to the connection to the consumer, the DSO provides meter reading data to
the supplier. The supplier cannot carry on its business without the DSO (due to the ne-
cessity of the unbundling of activities) in the deregulated markets. Indeed, the DSO is
de rigueur for the supplier as the DSO makes it possible to the supplier to move the of-
fer forward by providing the physical infrastructure and metering (which forms the basis
14 Market mechanisms of Elspot and Elbas as well as the balancing market are described in Chapter 2.2.
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for the invoicing). However, the DSO is not seen as direct complementor to the supplier
as it is to the consumer in terms of value delivery. Consequently, the relationship be-
tween the DSO and supplier is shown using the dash line. Furthermore, meter provider,
meter reading and control service, and meter installation and maintenance service are
the suppliers of the DSO providing the requisite inputs to manage its offer.
Moreover, as electricity cannot be stored and the foregoing demonstrates solely the pri-
or-the-delivery markets, the balancing market is needed to take into consideration from
the  vantage  point  of  on-time  and  after-the-delivery  markets.  In  this  regard,  the  TSO
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Figure 5-2: Swimlane blueprint of Finnish electricity supply ecosystem. Electricity
sales are considered the focal operation in the ecosystem. The solid lines show the path
of value delivery; the short dash line indicates the DSO’s obligation to provide meter-
ing data to the supplier; the long dash line expresses the regulator’s supervisory role
on the system operators.
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plays a crucial role providing the critical coordination service that balances load and
generation in real time. When the supplier’s forecast go wrong, it has to acquire balanc-
ing power from the TSO which, in turn, procures regulating and reserve power from the
producers and interruptible loads. Furthermore, the TSO functions also in a role of
complementor for the electricity supplier (see Figure 5-2) enabling the supplier’s con-
tinuous operation and value proposition to the end customer (i.e., the consumer in this
case). Taking the preceding discussion together, the ecosystem depiction can be ex-
panded to illustrate the current state of the Nordic electricity market within the limits of
this study.
As the role of regulatory authorities is remarkably important in this specific field, one
salient regulator is also represented in the ecosystem figure. The DSOs’ and TSOs’ rea-
sonable returns are regulated by authorities since they are operating as regulated mo-
nopoly actors. For example, in Finland, the EMV functions as the regulator ensuring
that the transmission and distribution tariffs stay reasonable. The relation of the regula-
tor to system operators is shown using the dash line because the regulator is unengaged
in the value delivery as such; instead the regulator supervises the system operators ret-
rospectively.
As a remark, neither the depiction above nor the ones further try to include every aspect
concerning the corresponding market, but strive for providing an adequate insight into
relationships and roles between the actors influencing the value proposition. Further-
more, the ecosystem design takes purposely no stand on single firms but their functions
instead. Additionally, for instance, government subsidies for RES or whether the pro-
duction is nuclear power, gas, water, wind, etc. are left out from the figures.
Now, concerning the emerging smart grid a number of things are changing. To begin
with, the consumers (at least some of them) are becoming prosumers that, in addition to
consuming, produce electricity, as well. Given the two-way connection of smart grid,
prosumers  will  be  able  to  set  up  their  own  generation  (e.g.,  wind  or  solar  power)  on
their premises and sell energy in the market if they do not want to consume it by them-
selves. Conversely, the foregoing is not revolutionary from the ecosystem point of view
as producing consumer is treated as an electricity producer. Instead, prosumers own
production—especially merged with the electricity storage—is groundbreaking relative
to  DR as  they  do  not  have  to  reduce  their  consumption  according  as  the  supplier’s  or
DSO’s needs, but they can substitute the demand for own production and storage and,
moreover, supply surplus electricity into the grid.
Accordingly, smart meters play a vital role by communicating the prosumers’ consump-
tion  and  production  with  the  suppliers  and  utility  that,  in  turn,  could  utilize  the  infor-
mation in controlling the balancing costs and ensuring the quality of energy, respective-
ly. Taking this and the recent discussion together, the consumer or prosumer may not be
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considered as the end customer in the DR ecosystem. More likely the prosumer could be
seen as an intermediary standing between the participant offering the DR service and
the end customer that actually benefits the most of the offer. Alternatively, the end con-
sumer can also be seen as a complementor enabling an intermediary or the end customer
to move the offer forward or make the most of it, respectively. On the other hand, the
consumer  or  prosumer  could  act  as  a  supplier,  as  if  an  enabling  actor  that  makes  the
whole service possible.
Furthermore, incentives are one problem, in seeing the prosumer as the end customer in
the DR ecosystem. What the participant offering DR service has to offer to the end cus-
tomer so that she could benefit from it? What is the value proposition? It is not difficult
for one to draw the same conclusion as Sioshansi has done: “although many retailers
offer energy services consulting to larger customers, current market arrangements mean
that it is not generally in a retailer’s financial interests to promote energy savings”
(2012, p. 52). The consumers consuming less energy will not gain the suppliers’ profits
in the long term (in the short term there is a possibility that customers switch their elec-
tricity contracts to the supplier offering lower prices and, moreover, the supplier may
gain in this way as compared to competitors). Moreover, little savings from shedding
consumption are secondary to consumers’ desire for comfort and convenience, albeit the
ways in which energy efficiency may be improved are generally in the public domain
(Fuller et al., 2010; Hauser & Crandall, 2011).
The first step in constructing a value blueprint is identification of the end customer and
the identification of ‘your own project’ is not until second. Nevertheless, the focal busi-
ness—i.e., the own project—in the ecosystem to be examined is perhaps already clear:
the DR service. Hence, the potential value proposition should promise profit gains from
cutting costs by steering the consumers’ energy consumption. Through a wider lens, the
value proposition should promise lower investment needs in peaking generation, reserve
margins, and transmission and distribution capacity in the longer term. The potential
value propositions for various actors were already discussed in Chapter 2.4.3 (pp. 33–
36). Now, the next section presents the major issues that are impeding the implementa-
tion of DR and delivery of the value propositions.
5.3 Demand response ecosystems’ challenges
The recognition of the most significant and fundamental issues hindering the adoption
of DR in Finland was the main theme of the last DR workshop. The recognition of the
issues based on five swimlane figures that were drafted in advance of the workshop (see
Appendix 3). The aim was to provide a list of reasons for the identified bottlenecks in
the electricity supply ecosystem. Additionally, the intention was to compile a list of ac-
tions how to overcome these issues. Consequently, the workshop provided important
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insights into ecosystem challenges to address and how to reconfigure the ecosystem
concerning the emergence of DR.
Four major issues were identified during the study: (A) regulation, (B) function divided
market, (C) consumer participation, and (D) limited functionalities, see Table 5-1. Two
clearly visible hurdles to the adoption of DR drew the main attention of the experts in
the workshop. First, the regulation model is unclear in Finland. The lack of unambigu-
ous regulation and understanding of regulatory supervision raise questions about the
monetary  benefits  of  DR,  such  as  “who would  expect  ROI”  and  “who pays  the  infra-
structure”? Second, the function divided market for distribution and supply leads to
more complex relationships between the actors. Furthermore, the divided markets lead
to partial optimization among the market players as various elements aim for the differ-
ent goals.
Issue A: Regulation
The regulatory issue is clearly the most important one since the regulator determines the
boundary conditions—the focus group was unanimous in this concern. Moreover, a
number of scholars and other parties support this view as well (e.g., Bryce, 2009; Hull,
2010; Hurley et al., 2013; Lehr, 2013; Simon, 2010). Hitherto, the regulator has defined,
for instance, the minimum requirements for DSOs which excludes DR services (further
in detail). That is, the DSOs have no incentive to invest in DR offerings in general, as
they will not receive a return for their investment. Instead, because regulation allows
DSOs to offload most grid investments onto their customers through network tariffs,
they are further likely to tilt away from DR functionality investments.
Regulation of this kind is somewhat contradictory, since, via DR exploitation, the DSOs
could defer their grid investments and ease RES integration on one hand, but the grid
investments yield sound ROI on the other. Note that, in Finland, the Section 5 of the
Limited Liability Companies Act (624/2006) stipulates “the purpose of an incorporated
(or limited) company is to generate profit to the shareholders, unless otherwise provided
in the Articles of Association”. Now, since the DSOs’ returns are regulated under the
reasonable return, there is no clear reason why a DSO would invest in DR under the
current circumstances.
Furthermore, the regulator has set the minimum requirements for electricity consump-
tion metering, including the hour based metering, remote control (switch on and off),
and load control relays (or a relay and a slot for another). These requirements are sub-
stantially fulfilled; however, the required meter functionality is insufficient in order to
exploit a modern DR. For example, real time metering, several relays, and power load
reading (instead of energy) would improve the feasibility of the meters, but nothing is
likely to happen, unless the regulator otherwise provides. Moreover, in Finland, the reg-
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ulation of being up-to-date is revised approximately in five-year intervals; thus,
amendments are considered periodically.
In the AMR case, meter reading and control are DSOs’ responsibilities. Taking the pre-
vious discussion together, a DSO cannot, however, provide DR service since the service
is not treated as part of distribution business. Furthermore, the DSOs must be impartial
toward electricity suppliers as well as other possible unregulated market players. That
is, a DSO is obliged, for instance, to provide congruent services to all electricity suppli-
ers without discriminating the others. Now, this kind of operation would probably jeop-
ardize the system reliability if various actors controlled the meters in compliance with
one’s own interests. As a result of this contradiction, the DSOs provide additional ser-
vices to no one, meaning that the full potential of the already installed meters cannot be
Table 5-1: Major issues that are hindering the adoption demand response applications
in the Finnish electricity market.
Issue Specification
(A) Regulation x Unclear regulatory model. Should there be some or any prede-
termined responsibilities concerning DR utilization or infrastruc-
ture?
x Contradictions between regulation, market, and DR benefits.
DSO could probably benefit from DR but it might hamper sup-
pliers’ business.
x DSOs’ duties and responsibilities; owns the AMR meters but
cannot exploit them in DR purposes.
x Prosumer-to-prosumer trading. This could rationalize electricity
trading since prosumers’ would avoid transfer costs.
(B) Function divided market x Conflict of interests. Suppliers strive for minimal daily electricity
costs whereas DSOs for stable grid.
x Lack of concrete proof of DR benefits for various market players.
‘Win, win, win’ business not proved.
x Who pays the infrastructure to enable more modern DR?
x The Finnish grid infrastructure is ‘too of high-quality’ to indicate
concrete need for DR.
(C) Consumer participation x How to activate consumers or prosumers?
x Comfort and convenience seem more important than economic
benefits, which might be low in Finland.
x Poor payback time. Relatively low prices of electricity indicate
low savings from DR programs in Finland.
(D) Limited functionalities x Stand-alone DR solutions lack functionality.
x Low customer value. Would an increase in a number of function-
alities increase customer value?
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utilized.
The other regulated market participant is TSO, of which duties include the management
of the balancing market. DR operator could do decent business by aggregating loads and
participating in the balancing market. However, current minimum bid to the balancing
market is ten megawatts of electric power in fifteen minutes, and that is an issue. For
example, let us assume that a house consumes constantly an average of two kilowatts of
power. Each of these houses provides twenty percent of its load to be remotely con-
trolled. In order to participate in the balancing market, DR service provider would need
25,000 households under its control to reach the ten megawatts limit. Consequently, ad-
dressing this issue will demand a new approach to organizing the balancing market and
ancillary services. One potential way to address the issue could be distributed balancing
markets with lower bid limits. The distributed balancing market depends on grid topol-
ogy since the current model requires a pool of electricity generation to ensure the func-
tionality of the ancillary services.
The novelty of DR business on liberalized electricity markets is probably the major rea-
son for the regulatory issues. Among other issues the regulator faces, decentralized trad-
ing is one that is not addressed in the current regulatory model. For example, trading
between neighbors might enhance the overall effectiveness of DR and DSM, but cen-
tralized electricity markets oblige that electricity is traded in the common market place.
Furthermore, the centralized electricity markets and annually-leveled distribution pric-
ing do not support prosumers, for instance. That is, the prosumers would acquire the
maximum benefit  from their  own extra production in a case when they could sell  to a
neighbor (i.e., low distribution costs) and aggregated consumption, as well as produc-
tion, would be calculated hourly (i.e., take advantage of peak hours). In conclusion, the
DSOs’ pricing model defines the profitability of the prosumer business. At the moment,
DSO’s role in general  is  to connect consumers to distribution grid.  As of yet,  the role
excludes DR supporting activities.
The lack of clear regulatory guidelines probably reflects the complexity of this matter.
Regardless of the complexity, some of the concerning regulatory issues are prudently
being addressed, namely DR in relation to regulated operations. According to EMV’s
recent pronouncement “uudet palvelukonseptit ja regulaation rajapinnat (new service
concepts and interfaces of the regulation)” (Dnro 592/421/2013), DR is considered nei-
ther distribution nor transmission operation, and thus the DSOs’ tasks exclude demand
response. In other words, DR business is deregulated meaning that a DSO could poten-
tially arrange DR service as a spin-off since the profits would not affect the DSO’s rea-
sonable return. It must be noted, however, that the system operators shall unbundle any
electricity system operations from other electricity trade operations, including DR.
Now, that the field of DR is open for generally anyone, the conflict of interests, and
AMR utilization in DR purposes, yet exist.
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Issue B: Function divided market
In Finland and the Nordic countries, the liberalization has left in a situation where vari-
ous players naturally strive for their own interests. The behavior of this kind results in
partially optimized operations instead of total benefit of DR. Note that one could argue
the liberalization leading to greater total benefit compared to the U.S., for example,
where vertical integration of DSOs and suppliers is allowed, constituting the utilities.
The aforementioned EMV’s pronouncement means that the DSOs’ cannot execute DR
actions unless the actions address technical grid issues that could jeopardize the security
of supply.  Hence, DR actions shall  be a necessity from the security of supply point of
view, since commercial motives are not eligible due to the requirement of equal treat-
ment of the suppliers as well as other deregulated players. Additionally, the equal treat-
ment of others states that the DSOs cannot provide their meter reading and control func-
tionality to only one deregulated player (e.g., supplier or DR service provider), as when
doing so it would have to provide the same service to everyone. As a result, the utiliza-
tion of AMR meters in DR purposes is hard, and the DSOs are clearly willing to offer
the meter reading and control to no one.
Now, the regulatory framework and divided market have hindered the discovery of a
sound DR business case. For instance, as for a DSO, commercial motives to exploit DR
are not an eligible driver for it, of which reason an unclear business case for the DSO
exists. That being said, a corresponding DSO is obligated to compensation proceedings
in situations where over a twelve-hour blackout occur within its remit in Finland. That
is, the DSOs are surely interested in means whereby they could avoid the compensation
costs. It is, however, a tough question what is a commercial motive and what is proac-
tive behavior. For instance, proactive behavior could be partial load shedding (i.e., pow-
er curtailment) whereby DSOs could eschew the costs caused by disturbance in the dis-
tribution. Furthermore, the proactive operations could be scheduled in a way that the
deficit of supply for an individual customer lasted no more than two hours. The question
is: what sort of compensation method is the most appropriate to the Nordic or Finnish
situation where few occasions appear a year?
Electricity suppliers could possibly take advantage of DR services, too. Electricity sup-
plier as the main beneficiary highlights the conflict between DSOs’ and suppliers’ inter-
ests, albeit the conflict of interests is not the only issue. Here, if DSO did not benefit
from the DR implementation, who would build the required infrastructure? DSOs clear-
ly will not. How about the supplier? At least without any standards, it is complicated for
a supplier to build the infrastructure since often suppliers are competing in the same ge-
ographical area. One possible solution could be an aggregator or some sort of an inte-
grator who would build the infrastructure and sell the access to it in market terms.
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To conclude, it is unclear who offers the DR or DR related service in the future. Anoth-
er  issue  is  to  whom  DR  is  offered.  According  to  the  workshop  outcome,  the  DSOs
should be considered as the main beneficiary of the DR services, albeit they cannot pro-
vide the service. The service must be provided and infrastructure built regardless. In or-
der to achieve a working DR environment, there is a concrete need for collaboration be-
tween various industries and market players as well as authorities and political institu-
tions (Heiskanen, Matschoss, & Saastamoinen, 2012).
Issue C: Consumer participation
Consumer participation in DR activities is fundamental, and the economic argument for
participating in a DR program is based on the fact that it would reduce the consumers’
electricity bill. However, no one knows beforehand how consumers of various types
will accept and respond to these activities. For example, considerable uncertainty exists
especially about smart pricing (Braithwait & Hansen, 2011) and, moreover, in Finland,
smart pricing has been perceived rather risky than beneficial (Heiskanen, Matschoss, &
Saastamoinen, 2012). DR would enter the consumers’ comfort zone and demand certain
actions in order to gain any benefits. Furthermore, failure in the adjustments (e.g., con-
sumer shifts one’s consumption to an even more expensive hour) would result in higher
costs of electricity than without DR. The possibility of this kind of failure will  not in-
crease the excitement around DR, and for the sake of certainty and convenience people
gladly pay the premium.
Hitherto, the convenience of electricity use has been unparalleled. For instance, no addi-
tional charges are offloaded onto consumers for excessive consumption or ‘wrong’ tim-
ing of use—generally, a second to none user experience.
The consensus among the workshop participant was that DR is more significant in terms
of system reliability and market effectiveness rather than consumer benefits. Heiskanen
et al. (2012) support the view, and they see cooperation with authorities as desirable.
However, while DR may be more beneficial for the system, consumers must involve in
the execution to some extent. Consequently, the incentive payments that participating
consumers would receive must be attractive in order to reach the mass adoption of DR.
Otherwise the majority of consumers will prefer the level of comfort and convenience to
small savings.
Issue D: Limited functionalities
More often than not, DR refers to a load shifting from critical times to moments of low-
er consumption. DR in this extent, however, may not be adequate to induce the mass of
consumers to participate in the programs, as discussed in Issue C. In addition to the
foregoing, single service technologies seldom provide considerable results and experi-
ence quality at a low price leading to poor customer value (see Equation (1), p. 29).
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Hence, the customer value is essential as long as consumers can choose whether to par-
ticipate or stick with the status quo. DR service must be competitive with other offer-
ings in order to reach the early majority (Heiskanen, Matschoss, & Saastamoinen,
2012). By offering only little functionality, it appears unlikely that DR will cross the
‘chasm’ (G. A. Moore, 2002) in the near future.
Demand-side management projects that address both DR and energy efficiency would
be more beneficial from the system point of view (Nemtzow et al., 2007). Energy effi-
ciency may be a potential approach to induce consumers as well since it could enable
not only bigger savings at consumer end but also business opportunities for companies.
However, DR itself offers no sufficient functionalities to comprehensive planning, but
perhaps DR could be additional functionality. Consequently, smart grid applications,
too, could be bundled with other services, such as security and maintenance (Heiskanen,
Matschoss, & Saastamoinen, 2012). Bundling would enhance the results and experience
quality over the price, thus increasing customer value, and moreover, increase technolo-
gy adoption. DR technology adoption would, in turn, facilitate the attainment of the de-
sired system benefits.
The limited functionalities relate specifically to the consumers since their benefits are
least justified, and AMR meters that are installed are technically divergent and restrict-
ed. Instead of simple DR, more comprehensive HEMS is thus seen more potential solu-
tion concerning the consumers. Through HEMS, both DR and energy efficiency could
be addressed, in addition to which HEMS could probably be easier to integrate into oth-
er services, including security and maintenance. The integration of several services
would, however, demand customizability since various consumers have different expec-
tations and requirements for the application.
5.4 Automatic meter reading
To begin with, becoming more familiar with the contents of the EMV’s pronouncement
(Dnro 592/421/2013) is useful. This is because the pronouncement determines certain
boundary conditions considering AMR based DR services and the roles of actors in cor-
responding business ecosystem. Figure 5-3 presents the DR service ecosystem where
DR service is just added to the electricity supply ecosystem without any other reconfig-
uration measures taken. The following paragraphs give a deeper insight into the pro-
nouncement and in conjunction with the empirical results of this study they endeavor to
provide reconfigured views on DR ecosystems.
At first, recapitulating the Electricity Market Act (588/2013) seems relevant. Pursuant
to section 3 of the Act, electricity system operation means placing the electricity system
for payment at the disposal of anyone needing transmission and other similar system
services. The system operation also includes consumption metering and other measures
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necessary for transmission and other similar system services. The metering data cannot
be disclosed to anyone, since disclosing it to other party than the customer or the corre-
sponding electricity supplier is prohibited without the customer’s permission15.
Furthermore, metering equipment shall be able to receive and execute or pass forward
demand response commands send via communication network16. Additionally, system
operator shall provide equipment featuring hour-based metering on customer’s de-
mand17. The equipment shall provide such features that both utilization of DR and DSM
are possible. Moreover, on consumer’s particular demand, system operator shall be able
to provide equipment with a standardized communication interface for real-time con-
sumption metering functionality.
Consequently, the equipment offered by the DSOs shall feature functionality to receive
and execute DR commands such that the suppliers or other market actor can provide DR
15 Statute of the Council of State (66/2009), 6:8 §.
16 Statute of the Council of State (66/2009), 6:5.3 §.
17 Statute of the Council of State (66/2009), 6:5 §.
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Figure 5-3: DR service ecosystem where the service is provided either to supplier or
DSO or the service provider operates on the power exchange (excludes TSO and bal-
ancing market). DR service provider acquires the consumer’s load profile from the
DSO for a meter data fee (MDF).
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services to their customers. DR is neither the DOSs’ responsibility nor electricity sys-
tem operation. However, switching on and off the relay in AMR meter on consumer’s
premises is considered no DR, and thus it is included in electricity system operation.
The EMV’s pronouncement stipulates that the system operators shall only provide the
metering equipment featuring additional functionality in order to the suppliers or other
market actors be able to offer DR services to their customers. Additionally, pursuant to
section 22 of the Act, system operators shall contribute to the efficient and economical
electricity consumption and utilization of load control options. The DSOs are eligible to
offload the costs that result from the DR enabling equipment acquisition, installation,
and maintenance onto their customers. However, the regulation disallows the DSOs of-
fload the costs resulting from DR services or hour-based metering onto the customers.
That being said, the DSOs can provide the DR services as well, but in order to do so the
service shall be managed as a spin-off business. Regardless of the manner the DR busi-
ness is exploited, the DSOs shall indiscriminately provide the hereinbefore mentioned
functionality to all service providers. However, the DSOs are obliged to offer the meter-
ing data no more often than once a day18. More often offered data can be subjected to
charge (see Figure 5-3 where the meter data fee is depicted) unless the data reading is
done by a third party via a meter featuring the standardized communication interface,
albeit the meter has been installed by a DSO.
Now, the preceding discussion clarifies the challenges of DR implementation. As a re-
sult, the delineation of a functioning value blueprint is extremely challenging, albeit cer-
tain boundary conditions are about to emerge. Nevertheless, as Adner puts it, “it is rare
for a significant innovation to start life with an all-green-light blueprint” (2012, p. 87).
That is, every element does not have to converge flawlessly at the outset; essential is to
understand the risks involved in a particular approach and find ways how to overcome
these risks.
The ecosystem in Figure 5-3 illustrates how DR provider pays meter data fee (MDF) to
a DSO in order to acquire customers’ hourly-based load profiles. Utilizing the load pro-
files the aggregator is about the offer DR service either to supplier or DSO, but it also
can participates in the power exchange and sell ‘negawatts’ there in balancing purpos-
es19. The ecosystem, however, encounters a few bottlenecks. First and foremost, the is-
sue concerning consumer participation still exists. At least when thinking of residential
consumers there seems to be inadequate incentive to execute DR commands. Second,
limited functionality of the meters, too, hinders consumers’ interests toward DR. Third,
18 Statute of the Council of State (66/2009), 6:6 §.
19 Negawatt power is theoretical power referring to amount of power (in watts) saved.
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regulation encourages no actor to pursue DR or its benefits as yet; the grid infrastructure
is ‘too high of quality’, for example.
In the current regulatory environment, direct load control through AMR (i.e., switching
the relays on and off) is considered electricity system operation. Hence, the third party
actor is ineligible to utilize DLC by using the relays on the AMR meters. Consequently,
an option is to use other incentive-based or price-based programs on the on-demand ba-
sis. However, as many times noted earlier, getting the consumers participate in DR pro-
grams is even harder without DLC. Simply put, people desire automation or at least
minimal human intervention in actions. Furthermore, smart grid solutions such as higher
RES integration and EVs are probable to increase interest in DR as well as other busi-
ness opportunities they carry.
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Figure 5-4: DR service ecosystem with smart grid solutions (excludes TSO and balanc-
ing market). Essentially, supplier is treated as the end customer instead of consum-
er/prosumer. The dash line indicates that regulator obligates DSO to provide AMR me-
ter reading and control service, albeit it is not directly involved in value delivery.
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Another option is that the consumers, or preferably prosumers, are interested in selling
their electricity savings, production, or curtailment to some market actor. Here, the
prosumer is not the end customer, but a service provider or enabling actor (i.e., provides
controllable load). However, large scale prosumer curtailment would probably demand
a third party aggregator, of which responsibilities includes the aggregation of the load
curtailments and, further, reselling the shed load. The DR service operator, or aggrega-
tor, can also be perceived as an integrator, incorporating the prosumers’ load profiles,
production and storage capabilities, as well as reselling the service, for instance, to a
supplier (see Figure 5-4). The prosumers load profiles could be acquired from a DSO
for a payment or via hour-based AMR meter installed in the prosumers premises by the
DSO. The DSOs play a keystone role in AMR ecosystem regardless, since they are
obliged to provide a prospect of DR service to third party companies.
However, the prosumers will need more intelligence in their premises in order to take
full advantage from the smart grid solutions. The more intelligent solutions suggest
smart  home  automation  (HA)  system  or  HEMS,  which  combines  the  electric  power
network with information and communication technology (ICT). Solely AMR-meter-
based solutions, even more advanced ones, are not smart enough to control energy con-
sumption or production automatically nor energy storage system.
Consequently, the AMR-based DR encounters troublesome issues with the current regu-
lation model, high quality of the grid infrastructure, and low adoption of the smart grid
solutions. However, the prosumers’ or consumers’ role should most probably be appre-
ciated as the service enabler instead of the end customer in this particular ecosystem.
Next section discusses potentially more forward-looking DR solutions, incorporating
HEMS with other smart grid solutions.
5.5 Home energy management system
Smart home energy management systems enable a vast number of functionalities that
are not limited to load shedding. HEMS could easily integrate automated DR other
functionalities, and lead to electricity savings without human intervention. According to
Piette et al. (2004), load response strategies may be enhanced with technologies and
techniques that allow for fully automated operations. Even though considerable uncer-
tainty still exists about how the end use customer will accept and respond to smart pric-
ing (Braithwait & Hansen, 2011), HEMS could facilitate the adoption of DR and, fur-
ther, use of its full potential.
One of the major differences between the HEMS and AMR-based execution of DR is
HEMS’s autonomy. That is, HEMS can be exploited independently of the meter provid-
ed by the DSO, but it can also exploit the standardized communication interface on
DSO’s meter (see Figure 5-5). HEMS is not only more versatile technology than AMR,
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but it is also deregulated. In essence, it must be remarked that HEMS market is current-
ly valued at $1.5 billion in the U.S. and forecasted to be worth over $4 billion by 2017,
and the market includes DR (Bojanczyk, 2013). Hence, it can be said that there is a
good reason to promote HEMS emergence to a large extent in the Nordic countries, as
well. Furthermore, a large scale implementation of HEMS could advance the electricity
markets economically, environmentally, and socially.
However, regulatory issues in particular are difficult and cannot be addressed through
technology in general. However, HEMS could be integrated in an HA system, thus of-
fering a lot of other benefits for the consumer in conjunction with security locks of
doors and other systems. In fact, integrated, full-service home management could create
markets for DR along with products and services that consumers comprehend and un-
derstand more easily than actual DR. Put differently, a consumer could have an interest
in the system through which she could automatically control and manage her EV charg-
ing schedule, energy storage, own production, and home surveillance; now, she decides
to acquire the system. The consumer could be told that the system includes the facility
to exploit DR. Indeed, the system is designed mainly for use as HA purposes, yet it ena-
bles complementary utilization in DR intentions.
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Figure 5-5: HEMS service ecosystem with smart grid solutions (excludes ICT, capital
investors, TSO, and balancing market). HEMS service provider offers home automation
(HA) and energy management (EM) systems to consumers/prosumers and involves them
in a DR program. The dash lines show that DSO should offer DR capable equipment,
but HEMS can also be exploited independently without this equipment.
5 DEMAND RESPONSE ECOSYSTEM 78
The consumers could be promoted by energy efficiency and home surveillance—
something more familiar than demand response. These systems work automatically or at
least with minimal discomfort. One important aspect that HEMS supports is that it can
be fully automated, as if plug and play, no human intervention necessary after the in-
stalment. In order to increase comfort, the system could feature an opt-out option. That
is, a consumer can override curtailment requests without a sanction. Obviously, these
actions would also reduce customer incentive payments. Nevertheless, due to the opt-
out option the consumers could feel having the final word on their own consumption.
Figure 5-5 presents what could a value blueprint of a HEMS service ecosystem look
like. To begin with, the value blueprint builds on the same hypotheses as the value
blueprint in Figure 5-4. In other words, regulator obliges DSO to offer DR functionality
via its meters and the suppliers endeavor is to refrain from purchasing expensive bal-
ance electricity from the balancing market. The HEMS value blueprint elaborates an
idea that the prosumers and HEMS service provider create a mutualistic or symbiotic
relationship. That is, they ‘work together’ each benefitting from the relationship. In
more detail,  HEMS service provider offers the combined HEMS and HA systems (in-
cluding DR) to prosumers against monthly payments. The prosumers’ monthly costs
could be subsidized with DR participation payments in electricity bills, in addition to
savings.
Furthermore, HEMS service provider could co-operate with a supplier such that their
common  customers  (i.e.,  prosumers)  would  have  the  possibility  to  sign  an  electricity
contract supporting the participation in a DR program. These collaborative actions
would most probably gain a competitive advantage of the supplier over its rivals, espe-
cially if the market model is changing into a more supplier centric direction, as Nor-
dREG promotes (see e.g., Åbrandt et al., 2013). On the other hand, it is desired that DR
would benefit the efficiency of the electricity market as a whole, including the power
system vantage point. The DSOs naturally receive the metering values through the
AMR meters on an hourly basis; however, HEMS could complement the meter by
providing real-time consumption information to the DSOs or even to the TSOs. The
TSOs in particular would benefit from the real-time data since their frequency control
requires short-time activation and response20. Anyway, this thesis focuses primarily on
the deregulated actors in line with the NordREG’s tendency toward the supplier centric
model.
Alternatively, the HEMS service could also operate without the interaction with a DSO.
In other words, the DSO is not a compulsory complementor to the HEMS service pro-
20 In short of flexibility in electricity production, elasticity is sought in loads through fast disturbance re-
serves. The fast disturbance reserve comprises manually-activated reserves, which can be activated in 15
minutes. Source: DR workshop in Vantaa on September 19, 2013.
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vider in the DR ecosystem, albeit the DSOs are still required for the purposes of the dis-
tribution of physical electricity to the consumers. That being said, the DSOs’ obligation
to provide the platform that enables other market actors to offer DR services may facili-
tate the adoption of these services. The vision of DR benefitting both the market and
power system as a whole suggests that the DSOs role should be noticed, too. Hence, the
DSO is taken into account in the ecosystem reflections.
Taking the preceding discussion together and developing further toward energy service
aspect, energy service company (ESCo) would be the only actor that has a direct rela-
tionship with the consumers (see Figure 5-6). Now, the ESCo would be responsible for
the customer interface concerning both the products and services. This would mean that
the ESCo, or the supplier as for now, would be the primary customer contact in almost
all electricity related issues, including the electricity contracts and DR. In addition to
ESCo, the new swimlane blueprint features a substation or distribution level energy
management system (EMS) which collectively aggregates the individual prosumers’
loads, productions, and curtailments. As Figure 5-6 presents, EMS operates in collabo-
ration with HEMS, thus aiming at ensuring the power system reliability while HEMS is
still to provide all the possible benefits to ESCo and prosumer.
As depicted in Figure 5-6, EMS is a DSO’s tool and the DSO provides the demand re-
sponse platform. As for HEMS, it is an ESCo’s tool to offer home automation and ener-
gy management services bundled with DR to the prosumer. Instead of the final custom-
er, the prosumer acts as a complementor to the DSO and HEMS service provider as well
as indirectly to EMS. As a result,  the ESCo is considered as the final customer of de-
mand response, albeit it offers the service to the prosumer in the last resort.
Put differently, the ESCo offers the HA service (including HEMS) to the prosumer who
benefits from the service in a couple of ways. Firstly, the prosumer can take the full ad-
vantage of the smart grid solution she has such as smart EV loading schedule, own pro-
duction, and smart electricity usage. Smart electricity usage would improve the energy
efficiency and lower the electricity bills. Secondly, participation in a DR program would
further decrease the electricity consumption and entitle the participants to incentive
payments (or subsidies, as mentioned earlier). However, the main beneficiary from ac-
tual DR would be the ESCo that could exploit the load control and curtailment in sever-
al ways, as discussed in different contexts earlier.
Besides, the reliability of then distribution system could be addressed with greater care
via collaborative utilization of HEMS and EMS. By having a well-designed EMS envi-
ronment and DR program, the end users of electricity would have the opportunity to
participate in and influence the market indirectly as well as help in improving the secu-
rity of supply. Simultaneously and as a consequence, the end users of electricity would
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assist the market to operate more effectively, meaning that the price of electricity re-
mains constant or at decent level.
In addition, the end users would reduce their  own risk of being disconnected from the
supply since the DSO could operate more means of maintaining system reliability and
preventative measures (Albadi & El-Saadany, 2008). This is how also DSO would bene-
fit from DR that combines electricity system level and consumer level automation of
energy consumption and production. In Finland and the Nordic countries, system relia-
bility is no issue at the moment; however, given the undeniable fact that we are moving
from a centralized energy system to a next-generation distributed energy system, the
utilization of RES is most probably to increase which leads to greater fluctuation at the
production end. Consequently, elasticity is also required at the consumption end.
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Figure 5-6: HEMS service ecosystem after the emergence of energy service companies
(ESCos) (excludes ICT, capital investors, TSO, and balancing market). In addition to
ESCo, DSO now benefits from DR via energy management system (EMS) that ensures
system reliability in conjunction with HEMS. In the focal lane, the dash lines illustrate
HEMS-EMS collaboration, meaning that actions are not taken if they jeopardized the
system reliability. The dash lines from the upper complementary lane just remark value
delivery to EMS and duplicate HEMS that occur to highlight the verification of DR ac-
tions.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Theoretical contribution
The aim of the study was to explore what kinds of demand response business ecosys-
tems can be identified in the Nordic countries—emphasizing on Finland—before their
actual emergence. The literature provided the justification for the need for DR, since the
energy sector is at a turning point with its 20-20-20 targets etc. Moreover, the ecosystem
concept has been argued to afford a useful toolkit to assess the coherence of strategy
and its inconsistencies (Adner, 2012, pp. 99–100). I adopted and further developed the
Adner’s (2012) value blueprint concept to picture the ecosystems in an effort to offer
simplistic visual depictions what the DR ecosystem could look like and what are the dif-
ferent pieces. The value blueprint is an example of visual illustration how the value of a
product or service is delivered to the end customers.
As for the value proposition concept, it has not been exploited to depict emerging busi-
nesses, or indeed of demand response. Hence, the thesis expands the value blueprint
concept to the phenomenon where it has not previously been applied, aiming at offering
visual views on demand response value creation. In other words, previous research has
not examined how demand response changes the structure of electricity supply ecosys-
tem, and what would be the new roles of different elements in the emerging DR ecosys-
tem. This study demonstrates the importance of the assessment of the roles, relation-
ships, and places of elements in business ecosystems—obviously in DR ecosystems in
particular. Although the importance of the ecosystem concept has been recognized in
the smart grid environment (e.g., Ginsberg et al., 2010), the interpretation of these eco-
system discussions has been complicated by the fact that the visualizations of the eco-
systems  are  not  simple,  and  they  do  not  manage  to  explain  issues  hindering  the  DR
adoption. In the Nordic countries, DR is still in its infancy, and I endeavor bringing
light  in  the  discussion  how the  consumers  and  other  elements  could  be  treated  in  DR
ecosystems.
As for this thesis, it identifies that electricity consumers must not be considered as the
end customer of DR service ecosystems. That it, the value proposition of DR is not of
most benefit to the consumers, and thus the consumers cannot be considered as the final
target of the value proposition. The identification of the role of consumers not necessari-
ly being the end customer strengthens the views of Adner (2012) and Cusumano (see
Hopkins, 2011) who state that the ecosystem of a new product or service should be as-
sessed at the beginning, and prior to launch of the product or service.
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Moreover, one of the major theoretical contributions of this study is the swimlane blue-
print. The swimlane blueprint concept, developed from the value blueprint, bring new,
comprehensible method to assess business ecosystems. Previously the swimlane repre-
sentation has been widely used in business process modeling but it seems to be helpful
and valuable also considering business ecosystems. The swimlane blueprint explicitly
maps ecosystem’s various elements and presents complementary actors in an unambig-
uous way grouped in lanes. After its discovery, the swimlane blueprint proved to be use-
ful when discussing the ecosystems of complex businesses.
6.2 Managerial implications
The value blueprint addresses the firm’s strategy and assesses its coherence and incon-
sistencies (Adner, 2012, p. 100). I report some major issues that impede the adoption of
DR services in the Nordic countries, especially in Finland. Now, regarding managerial
implications  of  this  study,  the  thesis  represents  some  views  on  how  managers  could
avoid potential pitfalls. Moreover, I attest the thesis shedding light on the importance of
ecosystem observation at the beginning of the project. As it seems, at least for DR, em-
ploying the business ecosystem strategy appears quite important. Herein presented DR
value blueprint depictions offer a ‘springboard’ to steer the discussion on a right direc-
tion. The depictions present some issues that arise when the final target of a value prop-
osition is chosen incorrectly. Furthermore, they highlight that the places of elements in
an ecosystem truly matters, and that the careful assessment of an ecosystem structure
may help firms and managers overcome inconsistencies and avoid risks they face.
Consequently,  in the context of DR, the thesis implies that  even if  a firm’s product or
service  is  good  and  useful,  the  offer  will  not  thrive  unless  the  ecosystem  thrives  as  a
whole.  Thus,  companies  should  address  DR  services  with  extreme  caution  until  they
manage to figure out how the ecosystem problem is unraveled. As yet, solving the puz-
zle may be tricky since government participation and support are seen desirable to or
even mandatory for smart grid initiatives to take off (Bryce, 2009; Hull, 2010; Hurley et
al., 2013; PwC & NVCA, 2008; Simon, 2010). Indeed, the aforementioned govern-
ment’s, or regulator’s, role only confirms the necessity of ecosystem level approach
concerning demand response services.
Lastly,  the  role  of  wannabes  seems  vital.  Wannabes  could  speed  up  the  business  be-
cause it might be hard for a single firm to promote and develop its product or service
alone. Competition not only makes companies vulnerable to underachieve compared to
their rivals, but it also promotes the success of an innovation in its early stages. I base
the statement upon the fact that union is strength in marketing and promotion of busi-
ness since it increases the coverage of the offering. Additionally, when there is competi-
tion, there is also more high of quality products and services than monopoly firms could
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offer because industries must evolve or adapt when facing new challenges or environ-
mental pressure if they are to avoid extinction (Fine, 1998).
6.3 Assessment and limitations of the study
The thesis provides insights how to assess demand response at an ecosystem level and
what hindering issues can be identified through the usage of the value blueprint concept.
Also, the topicality of the research is undisputable since the need for DR increases as
the share of intermittent generation increases, and importance of ecosystem level ap-
proach has been seen essential  in this field.  In actuality,  it  seems that the outcomes of
this study indeed expose substantial and sensible facts concerning DR in the Nordic
countries. Taking the nature of this study into consideration, the results are not meant to
be generalized, but rather represent a subjective view on the topic at hand. However, the
views and results are developed on experts’ opinions and secondary data sources; thus
they are non-exclusively individual opinions of mine. This does not eliminate the fact
that they are views, describing the qualitative and narrative nature of this thesis. Hence,
some reliability and validity related limitations concerning the used research method
must be assessed to clarify the usefulness of the results. As Olkkonen (1993, p. 38) de-
fines the terms reliability and validity, they are constructs describing how probable it is
that replicated measuring procedure yields the same research results and how well the
used method mirrors the reality, respectively.
Furthermore, Carmines and Woods (2005) provide guidelines to assess the validity
through construct, content, and criterion-related validity as well as reliability. However,
it has been argued that while the terms validity and reliability are essential in the as-
sessment of quantitative studies, they are not necessarily suitable in qualitative research.
For instance, Stenbacka attests “the concept of reliability is even misleading in qualita-
tive research” (2001, p. 552). She continues by stating that if it is used “the consequence
is rather that the study is no good” (2001, p. 552). Furthermore, some researchers have
argued that the term validity is not useful in qualitative research, and they have pre-
ferred other terms (e.g., Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Seale, 1999; Stenbacka, 2001). Conse-
quently, instead of reliability and validity, the terms credibility, confirmability, depend-
ability, and transferability are seen more suitable criteria for quality in qualitative re-
search (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The quality of this thesis is subsequently assessed with
these four terms.
As for credibility, the idea of the thesis is to provide views on demand response busi-
ness ecosystems in the Nordic countries. Since the aim of the study was to describe the
issues hindering the adoption of DR and present what kind of business ecosystems can
be identified as yet, the used research approach seems appropriate. I must remark that
the thesis is not to discuss how the ecosystem would emerge, but to provide a view on
the matter. Credibility of the results could be improved through proper demand response
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pilot programs that gave realistic data about consumer behavior and monetary benefits
of DR. That is, quantitative data could improve the results and, as a result, could have a
credibility enhancing effect on this topic.
As I mentioned earlier, the results are not generalizable as such and, consequently,
transferability of the thesis suffers in some extent. However, as it is also mentioned, it is
the narrative nature upon which this thesis rests, thus aiming at intriguing discussion
around the outlook for demand response. The results implicate that much has to change
in order to DR initiatives to take off, indicating that the electricity market environment
is probably different from now in the future. For example, the responsibilities of some
actors might change in process of time, and the responsibilities might involve liabilities
that are nonexistent or somewhat vague as yet. This is, nevertheless, obvious since the
future is unpredictable to a certain extent.
The overall generalizability seems to lack feasibility. That being said, the main findings
(i.e.,  consumers  role  and  DR  end  customer)  entail  some  generalizability  in  the  given
context when certain assumptions are taken into consideration. The main assumptions
comprise the notion that the prices of electricity stay relatively low, the quality of the
transmission and distribution networks are not to weaken in the short term, the explo-
sion of renewable energy sources is not in sight, and the DSOs cannot include DR in
their balance. Realizing these assumptions—that actually illustrate the present situa-
tion—the thesis has some transferability; for example, the consumers, or prosumers,
must be made active element in DR ecosystems. The ecosystem and value blueprint
concepts are transferable as well, albeit researchers may end up with different final re-
sults concerning the ecosystems.
As in quantitative research, the term reliability refers to the repeatability of the study.
Instead of reliability, Lincoln and Guba use the term “dependability” (1985, p. 300) to
describe repeatability in qualitative research. Dependability in a qualitative research can
easily be questioned since obtaining exactly the same results by repeating or replicating
the observation procedure seems a distant idea. That is because the empirical material is
based on subjective views which may be altered between the previous and subsequent
material collection, even if the participants were the same. Also, the essence value blue-
print modeling in this thesis is highly based on the participants’ current subjective
views. Thus, although the material collection was repeated or replicated exactly the
same way as in here, the end results would hardly be exactly the same. This is, however,
tolerable since the characteristics of qualitative research entail the notion that if the pro-
cedure (i.e., measure or observation) is replicated “we are measuring two different
things” (Trochim, 2006).
The material collection method I adopted has been documented after all, thus enabling
the repeatability or replicability. Additionally, the aforementioned issues concerning the
6 CONCLUSIONS 85
dependability have been regarded with a thorough literature review, including inquiry
into former research concerning the topic. Since the literature provides no satisfactory
knowledge on DR ecosystem as yet, other material collection not only strengthens but is
indeed essential for this study. However, I argue that the participants engaged in this
research project have the top knowledge on demand response in Finland; thus, they rep-
resent a trustworthy source of information with regard to needs of this thesis. If DR and
smart grid applications in general draw more attention in the near future, dependability
of this kind of study will most probably increase along with a growing awareness of the
topic as well as high-quality literature and research.
The last of the four assessment constructs is confirmability. As the results rest upon sub-
jective views, they can only be confirmed or corroborated, or disproved, with other sub-
jective views. The majority of the findings presented in Chapter 5 are achieved via col-
laboration with experienced researchers and professional, as discussed earlier. However,
some of the final results and value blueprints are the products of my own subjective
view in the last resort, and those results were not confirmed during the research process.
There is no doubt but that the research process itself may lack some noteworthy vantage
points, thus leaving unanswered some aspects one may view as important. After all, one
shall  note  that  the  aim  of  this  study  was  not  to  explain  all  the  alternative  value  blue-
prints, but provide some preliminary insight into those. When giving these preliminary
insights, the thesis leaves a lot of room for contradictory observations and views; I hope
this sparks off a debate on demand response ecosystems.
6.4 Future research and closing notes
To the best of my belief this is the first research document covering demand response
business ecosystems and value blueprints—at least to be publicly available. This clearly
implies a need for further research on this topic and gives researchers all the more rea-
son for studying demand response business constraints and opportunities. I claim that an
ecosystem level approach is essential in order to gain understanding how DR would
change the electricity sales ecosystem. Furthermore, ecosystem dynamics as well as
competitive dynamics are sure to change as the ecosystem matures along with the DR
services. The change in the dynamics stems from the idea that the value logic is about to
change in days to come. The value logic will change with prosumers that not only pur-
chase but also sell and store electricity, let alone intermittent energy sources that call for
demand-side management and demand response. That is, differing sources of value will
lead to differing ecosystem dynamics, thus making research of this thesis kind signifi-
cant.
Furthermore, to improve the quality of DR ecosystem studies, I suggest that large-scale
pilot programs must be implemented to acquire real user experiences in the Nordic
countries, on which to base earning principles and risk assessments. Until now, the main
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principle has been that the electricity curtailments consumers execute result in lower
electricity bills (e.g., Frilander, 2013). However, in Finland, the price of electricity is
already below the average in Euro area and quite low; for example, in Germany, the
price of electricity for households was roughly €0.29 per kWh  during the first semester
of 2013, while Finnish consumers paid only around €0.16 per kWh (Eurostat, 2013).
Low electricity prices in Finland undisputedly implicate low saving potential, as well.
Large-scale DR pilots, including incentive plans, would most probably shed light on the
guesswork about the true potential of DR in Finland. The empirical data acquired
through the pilots would expose new, well-founded views on the discussion as well as
monetary benefits and, thus, DR ecosystems and value blueprints visualization.
As mentioned, unclear regulation concerning DR impedes its emergence. Consequently,
regulation models should also be thoroughly studied. Studies on regulation models
could include discussion on tariff structure possibilities (cf. feed-in tariffs) in the con-
text of DR. Demand response tariffs could facilitate the emergence of DR services and
subsidize initial capital needs.
Last but not least, I must highlight the need for more holistic research on market oppor-
tunity and competitive dynamics of DR service providers in particular. This should in-
clude the issue concerning DR service providers independency. In other words, studies
on independent DR service providers role should be carried out, since it is not clear
whether DR services should be offered by an independent actor or should, for example,
a supplier include DR in its offer. As the Adner’s value blueprint is specific about the
elements and their location, not their ownership, the aforementioned reasoning should
not directly affect the visualization of the ecosystems. However, it is sure to have an
effect on competitive dynamics facing firms in electricity markets. Hence, the emer-
gence of DR is most likely to have somewhat of a disruptive influence in the market.
Furthermore, as wannabes could fuel the competition, similarly disruptiveness could
bring about new challenges or environmental pressure to firms to manage.
In the U.S., demand response along with other energy management applications is al-
ready a lucrative business. I believe it is just a matter of time before the business thrives
in the Nordic and other countries, as well. Ecosystem approach could help in solving the
puzzle, spurring the emergence of demand response. What is the solution to the puzzle?
That is the question. Getting the answer demands more research and more researchers to
sink their teeth into the topic—credit where credit is due.
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Demand response options
Policymakers have several tariff and program options for eliciting demand response.
The most commonly implemented options are described below.
Table A1-1: Price-based demand response options. Adapted from the U.S. Deparment
of Energy (2006, p. 9).
Tariff options (“price-based” demand response)
Time-of-use (TOU)
TOU is a rate with different unit prices for usage during different blocks of time, usually defined
for a 24-hour day. TOU rates reflect the average cost of generating and delivering power during
those time periods. TOU rates often vary by time of day (e.g., peak vs. off- peak period), and by
season and are typically pre-determined for a period of several months or years. Time-of-use
rates are in widespread use for large commercial and industrial (C/I) customers and require me-
ters that register cumulative usage during the different time blocks.
Real-time pricing (RTP)
RTP is a rate in which the price for electricity typically fluctuates hourly reflecting changes in
the wholesale price of electricity. RTP prices are typically known to customers on a day-ahead
or hour-ahead basis.
Critical peak pricing (CPP)
CPP  rates  include  a  pre-specified high rate for usage designated by the utility to be a critical
peak period. CPP events may be triggered by system contingencies or high prices faced by the
utility in procuring power in the wholesale market, depending on the program design. CPP rates
may be super-imposed on either a TOU or time-invariant rate and are called on relatively short
notice for a limited number of days and/or hours per year. CPP customers typically receive a
price discount during non-CPP periods. CPP rates are not yet common, but have been tested in
pilots for large and small customers in several states (e.g., Florida, California, and North and
South Carolina).
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Table A1-2: Incentive-based demand response options. Adapted from the U.S. Depar-
ment of Energy (2006, p. 9).
Program options (“incentive-based” demand response)
Direct load control (DLC)
DLC is a program in which the utility or system operator remotely shuts down or cycles a cus-
tomer’s electrical equipment (e.g. air conditioner, water heater) on short notice to address system
or local reliability contingencies. Customers often receive a participation payment, usually in the
form of an electricity bill credit. A few programs provide customers with the option to override
or opt-out of the control action. However, these actions almost always reduce customer incentive
payments. Direct load control programs are primarily offered to residential and small commer-
cial customers.
Interruptible/curtailable (I/C) service
I/C programs integrated with the customer tariff that provide a rate discount or bill credit for
agreeing to reduce load, typically to a pre-specified firm service level (FSL), during system con-
tingencies. Customers that do not reduce load typically pay penalties in the form of very high
electricity prices that come into effect during contingency events or may be removed from the
program. Interruptible programs have traditionally been offered only to the largest industrial (or
commercial) customers.
Demand bidding/buyback programs
These are programs that (1) encourage large customers to bid into a wholesale electricity market
and offer to provide load reductions at a price at which they are willing to be curtailed, or (2) en-
courage customers to identify how much load they would be willing to curtail at a utility-posted
price. Customers whose load reduction offers are accepted must either reduce load as contracted
(or face a penalty).
Emergency DR programs
Programs that provide incentive payments to customers for measured load reductions during re-
liability-triggered events; emergency demand response programs may or may not levy penalties
when enrolled customers do not respond.
Capacity market programs
These programs are typically offered to customers that can commit to providing pre-specified
load reductions when system contingencies arise. Customers typically receive day-of notice of
events. Incentives usually consist of up-front reservation payments, determined by capacity mar-
ket prices, and additional energy payments for reductions during events (in some programs). Ca-
pacity programs typically entail significant penalties for customers that do not respond when
called.
Ancillary services market programs
These programs allow customers to bid load curtailments in ISO/RTO markets as operating re-
serves. If their bids are accepted, they are paid the market price for committing to be on standby.
If their load curtailments are needed, they are called by the ISO/RTO, and may be paid the spot
market energy price.
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The steps to construct a value blueprint (Adner, 2012, pp. 85–87)
1. Identify your end customer. Ask: Who is the final target of the value proposi-
tion? Who ultimately needs to adopt our innovation for us to claim success?
2. Identify your own project. Ask: What is it that we need to deliver?
3. Identify your suppliers. Ask: What input will we need to build our offer?
4. Identify your intermediaries. Ask: Who stand between us and the end customer?
Who touches our innovation after us, and to whom do they pass it on the way to
the end customer?
5. Identify your complementors. For each intermediary ask: Does anything else
need to happen before this intermediary can adopt the offer and move it forward
to the end customer?
6. Identify the risks in the ecosystem. For every element on the map ask:
a. What is the level of co-innovation risk this element presents—how able
are they to undertake the required activity?
b. What is the level of adoption risk this element presents—how willing are
they to undertake the required activity?
It is often most productive to characterize the status of each ele-
ment of your innovation effort along a green-yellow-red traffic light con-
tinuum. For co-innovation risk, green means that they are ready to and in
place; yellow means that they are not yet in place, but that there is a
plan—they must be late, but they’ll get there; and red means that they are
not in place and there is no clear plan. For adoption risk, green means
your partners are eager to participate and see clear surplus from their in-
volvement; yellow means that they are neutral but open to inducement;
and red means they have clear reasons to prefer status quo and prefer not
to participate in the proposition as it stands. In assessing the risk implied
by new links, it is important to consider the incentives of each linked par-
ty to choose to interact in this new way.
7. For every partner whose status is not green, work to understand the cause of the
problem and identify a viable solution.
8. Update the blueprint on a regular basis. Your value blueprint is a live document,
and as conditions change over time, it will need to be modified accordingly.
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The poster the author presented in the SGEM unconference
